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5DERIVATIVES REPORTING PRACTICES BY MULTINATIONALS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
exposure by the largest non-financial firms headquartered 
in the US or Europe. Since the populations of these 
geographic regions are ageing, understanding the 
implications of these choices for corporate risk and 
performance becomes increasingly important. 
The empirical analysis conducted in this study draws on 
the derivatives reporting practices of a sample of large US 
and EU multinational firms during 2005–08, a period of 
regulatory change when globally comparable and relatively 
standardised derivatives and pension reporting rules were 
first implemented. 
The study develops specific predictions concerning the 
association between firm-specific factors and derivatives 
use, the level of use and changes in use over time. It also 
explores broader connections between these factors and 
the exposure of firms to interest rate and foreign currency 
fluctuations, hedge effectiveness, and variations in 
operating earnings and cash flows. 
Furthermore, the study investigates the relation of firm-
strategic decisions to various sources of both market risk 
and to idiosyncratic risks, ie risks that arise from the 
activities of a particular firm; whereas systemic risks are of 
a more general nature, and involve the overall operations 
of the market. 
The strength of these relationships for EU and US firms, 
both separately and pooled together, are examined. The 
latter allows an analysis of the impact on derivatives use of 
a range of broader institutional factors related to 
accounting and regulatory quality. The research design 
utilises:
recent innovations in the measurement of discretionary •	
accruals
segmental information concerning foreign sales•	
interest rates•	
defined-benefit pension risk and funding •	
foreign currency exposures •	
the hedging ratio. •	
To examine further the interrelationship of firm-specific 
risk and the propensity to use derivatives, the study also 
estimates the equity cost of capital for the sample firms. 
These estimates provide a check on the cross-sectional 
regression results, and allow the study to draw inferences 
not only concerning the interrelationship between 
multinationals’ risk management policy and the extent of 
their use of particular types of derivatives, but also from 
systematic differences in these firms’ estimated equity 
cost of capital. Both standard and full information beta 
(FIB) cost of capital methodologies are used. 
In contrast to previous research, this is the first study to 
identify incentive problems as a specific alternative 
justification for the use of derivatives by multinational 
firms. It is also the first to undertake a direct comparison 
of the determinants and nature of derivatives use by 
US- and EU-based multinationals.
BACKGROuND
The corporate use of derivatives securities to manage 
various types of transaction exposure has increased 
dramatically over the past two decades in both the US and 
the European Union (EU). The deregulation of the markets 
for interest rates and exchange rates has stimulated a 
demand for various risk management tools. Nevertheless, 
there are a number of contentious issues as to whether 
corporations should attempt to manage such risks on 
behalf of their shareholders, particularly given the relative 
opaqueness of these instruments. As a result, prior 
research has had to resort to surveys, which are generally 
plagued by both response bias and subjective 
interpretation by users. 
Direct financial analysis of the value and risk implications 
of the corporate use of derivatives has become possible, 
owing to increased efforts to make these exposures more 
transparent as part of recent efforts to harmonise and 
standardise financial reporting. Both US GAAP and 
equivalent IFRS now require firms to recognise the 
financial impact of these exposures on their balance 
sheets, income statements and comprehensive income 
statements. Despite these developments, however, very 
little is known either about the broader interrelationship 
between the incidence, magnitude and risk, and earnings 
implications of corporate use of derivatives, or their 
broader potential interrelationships with corporate 
financial policy and various other sources of firm risk. 
With the increase in global competition and trade, financial 
theory suggests that multinational firms are becoming 
increasingly concerned about the relationship between 
their investment, financial and risk management policies 
as they are more internationally oriented and 
geographically diversified than smaller firms. It is argued, 
therefore, that multinational firms are much more likely to 
benefit from managing their diversified operations via 
derivatives use and risk management procedures. 
The existing literature provides little insight into these 
broader potential inter-linkages between derivatives use, 
risk management and integrated corporate financial policy. 
A comprehensive analysis of this issue is not possible 
without a detailed analysis of the various types of 
derivatives, their nature and level, together with an analysis 
of other sources of firms’ idiosyncratic risks. Analysis of 
cross-sectional variation in derivatives use also permits 
further analysis of the links between such practices and 
overall variations in firms’ earnings and their cost of 
capital.
ThE STuDy
This study assesses the relative and incremental 
explanatory power of the prediction that firms’ derivatives 
use can be related to specific firms’ financial 
characteristics, as well as to market risk and to 
idiosyncratic sources of risk. It focuses on choices made 
about interest rate and/or foreign currency market-related 
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6This is also the first study to identify corruption, regulatory 
quality and accounting as being an integral part of these 
choices, and extends its analysis to include the speculative 
trading of derivatives. Thus, the study provides a number 
of new insights into old issues concerning the 
determinants of derivatives use and their broader risk-
management implications.
The scope of the analysis is restricted by a number of 
issues related to the data set. The study does not consider, 
therefore, the implications for managerial performance 
evaluation. The analysis of derivatives use is also restricted 
by the lack of publicly available information about the 
quality and extent of risk management systems that are 
used to implement and evaluate derivatives use. A number 
of suggestions, for further refining and extending the 
empirical analysis, are made.
ThE fiNDiNGS
The study finds that there is a relatively strong and robust 
association between both the propensity to use derivatives 
and the level of use of derivatives with a range of firm-
specific idiosyncratic and financial risk factors. It predicts 
that these relationships hold for interest rate and foreign 
currency derivatives and help explain changes in the use 
level of derivatives. The findings both clarify and condition 
the results on the overall use of derivatives. 
The study estimates the cost of capital for EU firms under 
various assumptions about the methodology of estimation 
as well as different currency denominators of the investor 
in these firms. Using the full information beta (FIB) 
approach overcomes the limitations of the CAPM and FF3F 
methodologies in not recognising the differential costs 
associated with sales when segmented into domestic, EU/
US and other markets. The cost of capital for heavy users 
of derivatives of various types is in many cases 
significantly higher than for low users of derivatives. 
Overall, there are strong traces of support for the view that 
derivatives use by complex multinationals performs a 
risk-management role in mitigating sources of 
idiosyncratic risk and incentive problems. Many of the 
factors associated with derivatives use also imply that the 
capital structure policy of large conglomerates can be best 
viewed from an integrated and dynamic corporate financial 
perspective. 
Overall, the study finds a fairly robust relationship between 
both the propensity to use derivatives and the amount of 
use, and various financial characteristics of firms, although 
both the statistical strength and direction of these 
relationships vary considerably across the regions in which 
these firms are based. 
In particular, the finding that EU firms tend to view 
derivatives use much more liberally than that implied by 
the relatively narrow and specific focus on derivatives 
qualified for hedging treatment raises important questions 
concerning the corporate governance and accountability of 
these organisations to their shareholders and other 
stakeholders.
These findings must be viewed with caution, however, 
given the relatively short time-frame between the initial 
adoption of IAS by large European firms, and the 
implementation of costly and complex associated 
requirements of derivatives reporting. The sample period 
was not sufficiently long to undertake robustness tests on 
the effects of changes in fundamental economics affecting 
the provision of and demand for derivatives use, and 
various accounting and regulatory factors which control 
and mitigate the overall predicted relationships. Further 
research is needed to update and validate the overall 
results reported, particularly in the light of more recent 
changes to derivatives reporting after the latest financial 
crisis.
fuRThER RESEARCh
While the study has paid much attention to understanding 
the sources and nature of derivatives use by 
multinationals, and their broader linkages to corporate 
financial policy, the results and analysis can be further 
extended in a number of dimensions. Further research is 
needed to identify better measures for foreign currency 
and interest rate exposure of multinationals that have 
complex and interacting exposure to both types of 
instrument. More research is also needed to identify 
sources and the nature of idiosyncratic risk and 
discretionary accruals, both of which contribute to the 
opaqueness of reporting by these large entities. Finally, 
more work is needed to tease out the implications and 
interrelationships between overall corporate financial 
policy, including risk management related to derivatives, 
and other sources of retained capital, such as pension 
funds and other post-retirement benefits. 
The findings of this report also bear on current 
deliberations by the IASB concerning the use of cash flow 
hedge accounting approaches to derivatives reporting. It 
also has implications for the transparency of derivatives 
used by multinationals, in particular the role of over-the-
counter versus exchange traded derivatives. Further 
research is still needed on these issues.
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Financial risk management is broadly defined as the 
process by which management identifies, measures and 
controls financial risk exposure to large losses and the 
firm’s vulnerability to them (DeMarzo and Duffie 1991). A 
number of industrial firms have taken advantage of various 
types of derivative instruments to mitigate various sources 
of financial risk exposure. Recent reporting requirements 
for financial instruments do not fully take account of these 
new financial innovations, leading to potential 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, earnings 
mismanagement and the use of financial derivatives for 
non-economic or cosmetic accounting reasons.
In this study, we analyse the extent to which these 
exposures are also interrelated with other aspects of firms’ 
financial policies, including institutional factors associated 
with industry and/or accounting GAAP and GAAP 
application. In addition, we seek to understand the broader 
links between risk management, corporate financial policy 
and sources of idiosyncratic, or firm-specific, risk, such as 
exposure to largely unhedged defined benefit pension 
plans and other related unfunded post-retirement benefit 
obligations. 
The main purpose of our research is to assess the relative 
and incremental explanatory power of the prediction that 
firms’ derivatives use can be related to specific firms’ 
financial characteristics, as well as to market risk and to 
idiosyncratic sources of risk. We focus on choices made 
about interest rate and/or foreign currency market related 
exposure by the largest non-financial firms headquartered 
in the US or Europe. Since the populations of these 
geographic regions are ageing, understanding the 
implications of these choices for corporate risk and 
performance becomes increasingly important. Our 
analysis focuses on a stratified sample of European and 
US firms that populate the FTSE 500 index of the largest 
global non-financial firms, which are subject to either US 
GAAP in this area, or have recently implemented relatively 
new and comparable standards on derivatives reporting 
contained in IFRS, effective in EU countries on 1 January 
2005. 
In undertaking this research, we make a number of 
contributions to the existing literature. First, our empirical 
analysis of derivatives use by multinationals was motivated 
by the developing theoretical literature concerning the 
need to resolve incentive problems associated with 
decentralised decision making and control of large and 
complex organisations. In particular, Froot et al. (1993) 
and Froot (1995) depart from standard corporate finance 
theory by arguing that derivatives use by firms should be 
viewed from a broader functional perspective. These 
arguments imply that both the level and magnitude of 
derivatives use is associated with various sources of 
idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk, rather than with an 
institutional perspective, as codified by existing rules to 
focus narrowly on mitigating specific market risks. The 
implementation of comprehensive risk management 
programmes, and current controversies about their 
adequacy in changing regulatory environments, also 
affords an opportunity to compare derivatives use by US 
and EU firms, where regulatory and accounting quality 
differ significantly. 
Investigating the cost of capital implications of derivatives 
use is important for a number of reasons. First, from a 
theoretical perspective, estimating the cost of capital has 
become an important deduction from accounting profit in 
arriving at ‘residual income’, and for performance 
measurement and reporting. Many corporate managers’ 
remuneration is conditioned by a cost of capital 
calculation that in turn potentially affects the size of their 
bonus. Business units are often bought, sold, closed down 
or expanded on the basis of whether they meet their cost 
of capital. Many financial analysts’ corporate valuation 
models feature the cost of capital as an input. Estimating 
the cost of capital for the conglomerate firm may not 
capture idiosyncratic risks unique to the individual 
divisions constituting the firm, including both sources of 
transferable capital (eg derivatives) or retained capital 
(pensions). Jin et al. (2006) develop cost of capital 
estimates that ‘correct’ for the failure of current 
procedures to incorporate both the value and risk of 
pension plans. Previous researchers examining the sources 
of derivatives use (eg Bodnar at al. 2003) have not 
attempted to identify how developments in pension 
accounting rules can either enhance or obscure these 
interrelationships. An important contribution of this study 
is to examine the interrelationship of these choices the 
extent of firm discretion over obscure pension accounting 
rules, and consider their implications for estimating the 
cost of capital.
Prior research on this topic to date has focused largely on 
specific earnings-management incentives for derivatives. 
Zhang (2009) is the only previous study that has 
comprehensively examined the linkage between interest 
rates and foreign currency derivatives by reference to 
standardised disclosures for a limited sample of US firms, 
under the SFAS 133 (FASB 1998) regime. That study is 
restricted to examining derivatives use by new users of 
risk-management programmes, and does not examine the 
broader strategic, cultural and institutional factors 
affecting derivatives use by firms. In addition to 
considering the empirical implications of a relatively 
comparable and distinct set of multinational firms, this 
study develops new measures of risk that can be 
associated with derivatives use, including idiosyncratic 
risk, the hedging ratio and discretionary accruals. By 
developing a relatively comprehensive database of 
derivatives, pensions and financial disclosures related to 
foreign sales by these large enterprises, we provide new 
insights into old issues by exploring how cross-sectional 
variations in derivatives use may be affected by broader 
cultural and regulatory quality issues, and by the use of 
derivatives by multinationals for both hedging and 
speculative trading purposes.
Consistent with a broader financial perspective, we predict 
and find associations between the propensity to use 
derivatives and a range of firm-specific financial factors. 
We develop and test predictions concerning how these 
factors also affect not only levels of use of specific types of 
1. introduction
8derivatives, but also changes in use of derivatives over 
time since the new rules were implemented. We conduct 
further tests on the robustness of these posited linkages 
by reference to firms’ exposure to interest rate and foreign 
currency risk, determinants of the hedging ratio, and of 
co-variations in operating income and cash flows. We 
explore the incremental and relative association of factors 
associated with derivatives use, by controlling for 
regulatory quality and accounting quality factors, and for 
the use of speculative derivatives. The main finding of this 
study is that there is a positive association between the 
propensity to use derivatives and a range of firm and 
market risk measures. The level of use is related to 
earnings at risk, and changes in derivatives use vary 
across the geographical regions and regulatory 
environments. We also find that firms’ use and level of use 
of derivatives is positively associated with their cost of 
capital estimates; although we find that using a robust 
methodology that allows for full information concerning 
the mix of domestic, EU/US and other sales is important in 
conditioning our findings in this respect.
The remainder of this report is organised as follows. 
Chapter 2 provides the institutional background and 
research. Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses. Chapter 4 
discusses the data and sample. Chapter 5 reports the 
results of empirical tests. Chapter 6 develops various cost 
of capital estimates. Chapter 7 provides a conclusion. 
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(IFRS), the recognition and derecognising of financial 
assets and financial liabilities is addressed in IAS 39 – 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
(IASB 2004), while the offset of financial assets and 
financial liabilities and presentational disclosures is 
addressed in IAS 32 – Financial Instruments: Disclosure 
and Presentation (IASB 2005).3
Further, IAS 32, IAS 39, and, when applied, IFRS 7 (IASB 
2006), apply to the financial instruments of all entities that 
are prepared in accord with IFRS. There are no exclusions 
from the presentation, recognition, measurement or even 
the disclosure requirements of these standards. 
Nonetheless, insurance contracts are excluded. The 
standards identify a number of criteria for financial 
instruments to qualify as hedging instruments. The 
standards also set out a number of restrictive conditions 
and documentation requirements in order to justify the 
procedure. Finally, the standards discriminate between fair 
value and cash flow hedges and require separate 
classification of interest rate, currency and commodity and 
other hedging derivatives. 
A major issue arises over the implementation of these 
standards by multinational corporations whose shares are 
cross-listed on various global stock exchanges. First, 
US-based corporations and those that cross-list in US 
stock markets are required to reconcile their accounts with 
those prepared in accordance with US GAAP (ie by 
submitting either a Form 10K (US domestic firms), or Form 
20F (foreign firms) to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission). Thus these corporations are required to 
provide detailed disclosures in accordance with SFAS 133 
and these are enforceable by registration and via the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (s. 404) internal control enforcements. 
In contrast, multinational firms that cross-list in non-US 
exchanges face considerably less stringent requirements. 
Multinationals based in the European Union (EU) are 
required to adopt IFRS as required by the European 
Commission (but with explicit carve-outs for hedge 
accounting). Even so, there is no uniform enforcement of 
these disclosures as they are subject to disclosure-based 
3.  IAS 32 has both presentation and disclosure issues. IFRS 7 – Financial 
Instruments, issued in August 2005, will replace the disclosure 
requirements of IAS 32, and requires entities to provide more 
comprehensive disclosures in their financial statements that enable users 
to evaluate both the significance of financial instruments for the entity’s 
financial position and performance, and the nature and extent of risks 
arising from financial instruments to which the entity is exposed during 
the accounting period and at the reporting date, and how the entity 
manages those risks. IFRS 7 was not, however, fully effective for annual 
periods commencing before 1 January 2007; therefore there is only 
limited scope within this project to study the impact of this standard on 
disclosure and derivatives use practices.
This section provides the institutional background needed 
to understand the reporting environment. We also briefly 
discuss prior published research that bears on this topic.
2.1 iNSTiTuTiONAL BACKGROuND
This section comprises a brief overview of the major 
features of financial instruments and the relevant 
applicable accounting standards. A financial instrument is 
any contract that gives rise to a financial asset of one 
entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of 
another entity.1 The need for a specific standard on 
financial instruments such as derivatives arose from the 
apparent inadequacy of traditional accounting practices, 
which are founded on principles developed when the 
primary focus in accounting was on manufacturing, eg 
accruing costs to be matched with revenues. Financial 
instruments arise at the point of revenue realisation, ie the 
need to transform these inputs into cash or claims to cash. 
Enterprises can use derivatives either to monitor changes 
in financial risks or to speculate. 
The definition of a financial instrument is very broad, and 
includes interest rate swaps, Treasury bond options, credit 
swaps, equity swaps, bonds, receivables, loans and shares. 
The increasing complexity of the variety and nature of 
these instruments has, in turn, led to greater difficulties 
faced by firms in recognising, measuring, presenting and 
disclosing such instruments in the financial statements. It 
is recognised that the traditional realisation and cost-
based measurement concepts are generally inadequate for 
the recognition and measurement of financial 
instruments.2 In 1997, accounting standard setters in the 
UK, the US and internationally, combined forces to develop 
an integrated and harmonised standard on financial 
instruments; a joint working group was created to develop 
a fair value approach for financial instruments. The draft 
standard eventually drawn up by the joint working group 
proposed that all financial instruments would be recorded 
at fair value, with corresponding gains and losses reported 
in income (IASB 2000b). This implied that the fair value of 
an entity’s own debt would take account of changes in the 
entity’s credit risk and that hedge accounting would no 
longer be allowed.
These proposals have proved controversial, however, 
because they move considerably beyond current practice. 
Moreover they are conceptually problematic as they 
require more separation than usual between legal and 
‘economic’ ownership. For example, if an entity buys a 
quoted share in the financial markets, it may be entitled to 
the benefits and exposed to the risks in owning the share 
earlier than the date on which it is registered as the legal 
owner. There are also questions of derecognising and 
offset. Under International Financial Reporting Standards 
1.  IAS 32, Paragraph 11.
2.  ‘Recognition’ is the inclusion of financial instruments in financial 
statements.
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regulatory monitoring by national securities regulators.4 
Therefore, an interesting issue addressed by this study is 
to examine to what extent the use of derivatives is 
conditioned by market or firm-specific risk factors, after 
controlling for likely variations in the strength of regulation 
and enforcement in the various regions where 
multinational firms may be based.
There are situations, however, where the unintended or 
unanticipated accumulation of risks may be a simple 
consequence of inadequate accounting principles that 
conceal risk itself. For example, the demise of Enron has 
demonstrated the lack of transparency of leverage, and 
risk taking, by firms that move liabilities and risk exposures 
off their balance sheets by using complex special-purpose 
partnerships and derivatives. The same financial 
engineering tools that have served well in the efficient 
transfer of risks across otherwise incompatible institutional 
systems may also be used to hide large risks and value 
losses from even the most diligent investor. An important 
issue identified by Froot (1995), in particular, is the role 
and purpose of derivatives exposure in resolving incentive 
problems related to informational asymmetries within the 
dynamic strategic financial corporate management of risk 
and capital by large and complex multinational firms. To 
our knowledge, previous research has not really attempted 
to make such connections, as explored in our literature 
review below. 
2.2 LiTERATuRE SuRvEy – DERivATivES uSE
The existing literature suggests that risk management is 
the main motivation for the use of derivatives. Previous US 
survey-based research suggests that firms that face 
challenges to manage their firms’ exposure to various 
sources of market risk are more likely to use derivatives 
(eg Geczy et al. 1997; Haushalter 2000), while Guay (1999) 
suggests that firms experience significant volatility 
reduction after using derivatives. By contrast, Petersen 
and Thiagarajan (2000) and Hentschel and Kothari (2001) 
find little evidence of any relationship between derivatives 
use and firm risk. Huang et al. (2007) find that price 
exposure for a sample of UK firms for the period 2003–05 
is lower for a sample of UK firms with derivatives. However, 
they also find that derivatives use does not increase firm 
risk.5
4.  Multinationals based in non-US or non-EU environments are subject to 
even looser requirements. For example, firms based in APEC (Asia-Pacific 
Economic Community) countries typically must adhere to local or 
domestic variants of IFRS (eg Australian IFRS), IFRS as implemented, and/
or national GAAP (eg Japan and Canada). While APEC plans to adopt more 
uniform financial regulation in future, these have not yet been 
implemented in any standardised way. 
5.  Hentschel and Kothari (2001) and Huang et al. (2007) attempt to 
control for industry effects by deflating all variables by an average of two 
SIC code industry averages. This procedure assumes, however, that firms 
with higher equity volatility have a higher incentive to hedge. As we find no 
evidence of any such relationship, and since our sample comprises firms 
that raise their equity in various capital markets that suffer from different 
implied volatilities, equity volatilities are not comparable and we do not 
adopt this procedure in this study. 
Most recently, Zhang (2009) discusses the effect of SFAS 
133 on corporate risk management behaviour of US firms 
by hypothesising that the standard’s effect varies 
depending on the hedge effectiveness of the derivative 
instruments. New derivatives users are identified and then 
are classed as either ‘effective hedgers’ (EH) or ‘ineffective 
hedgers/speculators’ (IS) depending on whether their risk 
exposures increased or decreased relative to the ‘expected 
level’ after the initiation of the derivatives programme. He 
finds that risk exposures relating to interest rate, foreign 
currency rate and commodity price decrease significantly 
for IS firms but not for EH firms following the adoption of 
SFAS 133. 
Zhang (2009) studies only new users of the standard and, 
thus, risk exposures may vary considerably cross-
sectionally, depending on when the firm initiated the 
programme. The study is based on a large sample, where 
most firms hold no more than one of the three types of 
risk exposure. By contrast, most multinational firms in our 
study have exposure to both changing interest rates and 
foreign currency derivatives. Further, in common with 
other studies, Zhang (2009) focuses only on hedged 
derivatives use, and ignores the broader corporate use of 
derivatives for speculative trading. Finally, in common with 
other studies reviewed above, Zhang (2009) does not 
examine the likely effect of idiosyncratic risk, pension risk 
and other industry and cultural effects on cross-sectional 
variation in derivatives use. 
In summary, the existing literature provides little insight 
into how the adoption of fair-value oriented reporting of 
derivatives exposure is related to firms’ strategic decisions 
to use derivatives securities for risk management purposes 
and its consequences for cost of capital and shareholders’ 
wealth. While risk management is now a feature of many 
developed economies, perfect markets finance theory, 
upon which accounting standards are premised, provides 
little rationale for why multinational firms would seek to 
expend scarce resources to hedge unsystematic risk. The 
development of financial innovations in risk transfer, 
however, means that various market imperfections can 
create opportunities for such firms to maximise market 
value through hedging. In fact, there are a range of value, 
cash flow and accounting rationales for risk management. 
The above discussion highlights the importance of the 
hedging versus non-hedging distinction in the context of 
the use of derivatives. The existence of hedge accounting 
highlights the limitations of the accounting framework in 
representing a firm’s underlying economic exposure.6 This 
is because the reported accounting exposure – based on 
exposure of fixed obligations to floating interest rates or 
foreign currency rates – may, for reasons associated with 
the application of fair value measurement principles, either 
understate or overstate the firm’s true underlying 
economic exposure. 
6.  Ahmed et al. (2006) show that disclosure versus recognition affects the 
value relevance of derivatives reporting. 
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Cornell and Landsman (2006) analyse various aspects of 
SFAS 133. They criticise SFAS 133 for classifying fair value 
hedges, changes to which are charged to income, 
separately from cash flow hedges, which are charged 
against comprehensive income. Shrand (1997) further 
identifies interest rate sensitivity as an important issue in 
analysing the impact of new accounting rules on financial 
instruments. The broader literature, which draws on 
accounting disclosure and measurement to explain firms’ 
risk-management policies, has mainly sought to examine 
such policies through the analysis of ‘accounting quality’. 
Viewed from this perspective, firms attempt to manage 
earnings and their financial leverage by exercising 
managerial discretion over variations in GAAP application, 
the use of accruals, conservative accounting and by 
accounting-based bonus plans (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 
1995). The extent to which firms can exploit these factors 
is limited by the choices available under GAAP, audit 
quality, tax and enforcement, litigation by shareholders 
and enforcement of covenants by lenders. Since a firm’s 
decision to use derivatives that qualify for hedge 
accounting treatment involves discretion over the 
application of GAAP, one would need to control for other 
firm-specific factors, or idiosyncratic risks.
In addition, it is likely that firms’ operating and financial 
activities are exposed to market-wide financial risk. The 
increasing globalisation and integration of product, 
insurance and financial markets highlights the importance 
of the ability or inability of the firm to manage market or 
non-diversifiable risk, and their inability to do so is 
increasingly being exploited by powerful hedge funds and 
other speculative investors. Nonetheless, until relatively 
recently, efforts by corporations to hedge against the 
negative impact of these exposures on cash flows, 
earnings and capital structure by using derivatives were 
not even recognised in their balance sheets or 
performance. 
Previous empirical research has not examined whether the 
ability of firms to manage financial risks is systematically 
associated with their discretionary choices in managing 
accruals, reporting accounting exposures, and other firm, 
industry or cultural factors. Instead, it simply reflects the 
underlying economic exposures.
To our knowledge, current literature on the impact of 
derivatives use is based on survey data, which may not be 
representative owing to the low response rates that are 
typical of such an approach. An important exception is the 
study by Zhang (2009). In addition, existing literature 
normally examines the impact of financial instrument use 
by comparing that for an individual country to use in the 
US. In contrast, we use data for a broader sample of both 
US and European FTSE Global 500 firms. 
Under the restrictive assumptions of a perfect capital 
market, Modigliani and Miller (1959; 1963) show that 
capital structure is irrelevant to a firm’s intrinsic value and 
the cost of capital. There is, therefore, little rationale for 
the firm to hedge these risks by using any derivative 
securities for fund raising or asset exposure. 
Nonetheless, with market frictions, such as taxes and the 
cost of financial distress, there may be an optimal 
combination of different financial securities to finance the 
needed assets (Stulz 1985). While there is a trade-off 
between the benefit of a tax shield and the cost of 
bankruptcy when firms issue debt financing, interest rate 
risk still exists. For example, when the interest rate goes 
down, a firm can issue cheap debt. The old debt 
represents an opportunity cost. Change in financial 
leverage implies change in the cost of capital. There is little 
empirical evidence for the cost of capital and firm risk 
effects associated with the use of derivatives. Moreover, 
there is little or no evidence for an association between the 
propensity and incidence of derivatives use by firms and 
their exposure to other sources of idiosyncratic risk, such 
as pensions. This literature is reviewed below.
2.3 LiTERATuRE REviEW – PENSiONS
The existing literature (eg Barth 1991) continues to adopt 
‘traditional’ views, which includes corporate income 
taxation (Bulow 1982; Bulow et al. 1987), and asserts that 
pension liabilities can be valued in a similar way to 
corporate debt. Klumpes and McMeeking (2007) examine 
whether the abnormal returns of firms that voluntarily 
used market-based pension discount rates are significantly 
different from the abnormal returns of industry-matched 
pair samples of firms that retained traditional cost-based 
valuation assumptions during the period surrounding the 
release of the related exposure draft (FRED 20). UK stock 
price returns incorporate the effect of unexpected interest 
changes on sources of pension earnings for firms that 
voluntarily switch to market-based assumptions, but do 
not incorporate these effects for firms that do not switch. 
Their evidence is consistent with a risk-management 
explanation for pension exposure. This implies that a 
replicating hedge portfolio approach to analysing pensions 
is more strongly associated with share price returns. The 
unhedged component approach can also lead to more 
consistent analysis of pension impact relative to hedging 
activity on the firms’ interest rate exposure.
The research findings add to the existing empirical 
evidence that the systematic equity risk of UK firms as 
measured by beta from the cost of capital does not reflect 
the underlying risk of their pension plans (Jin et al. 2006). 
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In this chapter, we briefly discuss the costs and benefits of 
hedging for a multinational firm. We then develop 
hypotheses concerning specific types of derivatives used 
to hedge foreign currency and interest rate risk, and their 
association with various sources of market, firm and 
institutional risk respectively. In order to explore these 
interactions, we distinguish between systematic risk and 
specific or idiosyncratic sources. For example, focusing on 
leverage (for interest rate risk) and earnings from foreign 
operations (affecting the management of foreign currency 
risk). We focus specifically on relating these factors to the 
firm’s overall reported accounting exposure.7 
3.1 COSTS AND BENEfiTS Of uSiNG DERivATivES
Derivatives have generally lowered the cost and increased 
the precision with which financial markets are able to 
unbundle and distribute both interest rate and foreign 
currency risk. There are various arguments for the use of 
hedging by firms. In particular, various ‘market 
imperfections’ may create a solid case for corporate 
hedging. We consider a number of different arguments for 
hedging, each of which justifies our predictions in the 
following sections. The literature (eg Stulz 1985; Froot et 
al. 1993) has shown a number of ways in which hedging 
on corporate account can increase shareholder value. The 
substantial gains produced by hedging result from the fact 
that risk affects the expected cash flows that corporations 
can deliver to their shareholders because of taxes, 
transaction costs, bankruptcy and other sources of market 
imperfections. For most of these, a shareholder’s hedging 
on their own account cannot reduce the firm’s financial 
distress or change its expected liability. 
The major reasons for using derivatives securities are to 
manage, firstly, the exposure of assets and liabilities, and 
secondly, of internal operating cash flows and operating 
income. Myers and Majluf (1984) develop a pecking order 
theory which suggests that firms find that raising external 
capital is relatively costly in the presence of transaction 
and incentive problems. Froot (1995) extends this theory 
by arguing that the major reasons for using derivatives 
securities are primarily related to incentive problems and 
information asymmetries between a firm’s managers and 
its external capital providers. Informational asymmetries 
arise because incentive problems within multinationals 
generate frictional costs that also make externally raised 
funds relatively costly. Froot (1995) argues that corporate 
risk management programmes allow a multinational firm 
to use its cash flow more effectively by permitting it to 
shift the internal funds.
7.  For the remainder of this report we focus only on the use of derivatives 
solely for hedging purposes. Therefore, we do not seek to analyse the use 
of derivatives that do not qualify for hedge accounting treatment. 
While the costs of implementing hedging instruments can 
be high for any firm, we believe that for multinational firms 
these costs are low, relative to the benefits of reducing 
information asymmetries and for ameliorating incentive 
problems.
An important attribute of high-reputation firms is their 
ability to maintain high levels of sustainable or high-quality 
earnings over time. Another important attribute is their 
ability or willingness to engage in hedging activities to 
mitigate risk. However, empirical research has not so far 
examined whether the ability of firms to manage financial 
risks through reducing their cost of equity or enhancing 
their performance is systematically associated with their 
discretionary choices, which include managing accruals, 
reporting accounting exposures, other firm, industry or 
culture-specific factors, or whether it simply reflects the 
underlying economic exposures.
This study contributes to both the accounting and risk 
management literature by examining the incremental 
explanatory power of recent financial instrument 
disclosures over fair value hedging and cash flow hedging 
on the cost of equity capital, earnings and stock returns, in 
addition to the above established firm-specific, 
idiosyncratic risk-related determinants of equity return. 
3.2 hyPOThESES
We now discuss several hypotheses concerning the various 
testable empirical implications of incentive problems 
related to financial contracting within multinationals. Our 
hypotheses cover the following areas.
The overall propensity of firms to use derivatives, and •	
changes in their overall derivatives use over time.
The specific types of derivatives used to hedge foreign •	
currency and interest rate risk. 
The association between changes in firms’ •	
performance over time, and changes in financial risk 
and firm risk. We focus specifically on the exposure of 
firms to foreign currency and interest rate risk. 
The association of increases or decreases in derivatives •	
use with operating cash flow and operating earnings at 
risk.
The global variations in industry, GAAP, GAAP •	
application, enforcement and institutional factors 
affecting derivatives use. 
The use of derivatives by European firms for •	
speculative purposes.
3. Development of hypotheses
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It is likely that firms’ operating and financial activities are 
exposed to market-wide financial risk. The increasing 
globalisation and integration of product, insurance, and 
financial markets highlights the importance of the ability 
or inability of firms to manage market or non-diversifiable 
risk, and their inability to do so is increasingly being 
exploited by powerful hedge funds and other speculative 
investors. Until relatively recently, however, corporations 
were seeking to hedge against the deleterious impact of 
these risks on cash flows, earnings and capital structure 
by using derivatives that were previously not even 
recognised in their balance sheets or performance. In 
developing our hypotheses below, we specifically control 
for cross-sectional variation in both market-related factors 
(beta, book-to-market) as well as firm-specific factors 
(idiosyncratic risk, financial leverage, financial distress). We 
also control for internal sources of risk capital and cash 
flow, such as pension funding and risk, since the 
concurrent implementation of IFRS and US GAAP over the 
period of the study required firms to be more transparent 
about the sources of pension funding and risk on their 
balance sheets. Below, we separately specify specific 
hypotheses (H) relating to both (a) the propensity to use 
derivatives, and (b) the extent of use of interest rate and 
foreign currency derivatives. All these hypotheses include 
the assumption that all other factors are held constant.
3.2.1 foreign currency risk
Following Froot’s (1995) arguments concerning the need 
to reduce incentive problems, we initially predict that the 
propensity of firms to use derivatives is primarily related to 
the desire of multinational firm managers to manage the 
exposure of their existing assets, liabilities and internal 
cash flows better. To reduce incentive problems, increased 
use of foreign currency derivatives can be beneficial for 
firms subject to idiosyncratic risk affecting their global 
operations. We posit a positive association between usage 
of derivatives and specific sources of firm risk.
H1a: The propensity to use derivatives is positively 
associated with specific sources of firm risk.
H1b: There is a positive association between levels 
of use of foreign currency derivatives and specific 
sources of firm risk.
3.2.2 interest rate risk
Firms can also be subject to interest rate exposure. A 
change in interest rates has a direct impact on firms’ net 
financial assets or liabilities, and an indirect second-order 
effect on operating assets and sources of earnings. Failure 
to take account of unexpected market variations in interest 
rate changes can also have a serious effect on firms’ net 
cash flows arising both from their existing assets and from 
real options and contingent capital. Firms can manage 
these factors either by issuing contingent equity or by 
managing derivatives, such as swaps, futures and options.
Firms may seek to mitigate the effects on their 
shareholders by diversifying their borrowings from fixed to 
floating rates, or otherwise engaging in swap transactions 
or forwards. We posit that the level of interest rate 
derivatives use is primarily associated with sources of 
market risk. 
H2a: The propensity to use derivatives is positively 
associated with specific sources of firm-specific risk.
H2b. There is a positive association between the use 
of derivatives to mitigate the negative effects of 
changes in interest rates, and specific sources of 
firm-specific risk.
3.2.3 Changes in firms’ market risk exposure over time
We also examine, for a given level of disclosure and use, 
the propensity of firms to increase or decrease their use of 
derivatives over time. Zhang (2009) argues that changes in 
derivatives use following the implementation of new GAAP 
can help us to discriminate between cosmetic and cash 
flow rationales for hedging. 
Following Zhang (2009), we first separate effective hedgers 
from ineffective hedgers by identifying the propensity of 
firms to either increase or reduce their use of risk 
management programmes over time. We specify the 
relationship between the propensity to increase or 
decrease derivatives use and factors affecting firms’ 
market, idiosyncratic and financial business risk, their 
pensions risk and their exposure to hedged or unhedged 
interest rate derivative instruments. 
H3a. The propensity to increase the level of 
derivatives use over time is positively associated 
with specific sources of firm-specific risk. 
H3b. The level of increase in derivatives use over 
time is positively associated with specific sources of 
firm-specific risk. 
3.2.4 Cultural, institutional and regulatory influences on 
derivatives use
The above predictions assume that the propensity of 
multinational firms to use derivatives is primarily related 
both to firm-specific and market-specific factors. 
Nonetheless, there are strong reasons to believe that there 
are also significant industry and cultural or institutional 
factors associated with the use of derivatives. We have not 
examined whether the ability of firms to manage financial 
risks is systematically associated with their discretionary 
choices in managing accruals, reporting accounting 
exposures, other firm, industry or culture-specific factors.
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Traditionally, firms have attempted to ‘manage’ these 
exposures by variations in GAAP application, the use of 
accruals, conservative accounting and by accounting-
based bonus plans. The extent to which firms can exploit 
these factors is limited by the availability of choices under 
GAAP, audit quality, tax and enforcement, litigation by 
shareholders and enforcement of covenants by lenders. 
Since a multinational firm’s decision to elect to use 
derivatives that qualify for hedge accounting treatment 
involves discretion over the application of GAAP, one would 
control for other firm-specific factors identified by the 
literature as being associated with firm accounting choices 
(eg bonus policy, profit margin, asset turnover, return on 
equity, firm size).
Research (eg Bodnar at al. 2003) shows considerable 
variation in the use of derivatives both within and between 
the US and the Netherlands. Factors involved include 
culture, regulation quality, enforcement and audit quality 
incentives. Earnings management and the discretion over 
accruals are also frequently cited as motivations for 
hedging (eg Zhang 2009). 
Since multinational firms can choose where to locate their 
businesses, we argue that the factors listed above are an 
integral part of firms’ broader strategic choices concerning 
the location and timing of specific market, business and 
financial risk factors associated with derivatives use.8 
Variations in the quality of US GAAP versus IFRS, both in 
the application and their enforcement, have been cited in 
the literature as major impediments to capital issuance by 
firms. In addition, firms’ behaviour has been associated 
with broader institutional factors (Leuz and Hail 2006). 
Also, industry-sector factors may be important, since 
manufacturing firms are more directly exposed to these, 
and are less flexible than service firms in using alternative 
techniques (such as relocating or outsourcing).
H4: The use of derivatives by multinational firms is 
related to industry, enforcement and accounting-
quality factors.
We test these predictions by combining the EU and US 
firms into a single pooled sample and adding specific 
variables related to industry (manufacturing), US GAAP 
versus IFRS, a corruption index, and a Jones-modified 
measure of opaqueness, or discretionary accruals.
8.  Multinational firms can exercise discretion over where they choose to 
raise capital, and are effective in lobbying governments and accounting 
bodies wherever their interests are adversely affected by economic 
consequences associated with a new accounting rule or where they bear 
the costs of compliance. For example, a number of EU firms have recently 
delisted from the US following unsuccessful lobbying of the SEC. US firms 
have also cross-listed in European and Asian markets. The integration of 
stock markets (the merger of the NYSE and Euronext), as well as the 
standardisation of over-the-counter derivatives, and the trading of credit 
debt has also facilitated greater globalisation trends. 
In addition to the general institutional variations related to 
accounting, industry and institutional legal factors, there 
are also reasons for believing that European firms have a 
much broader view of risk management than do US firms. 
While the relevant accounting standards appear to assume 
that risks are to be hedged or reported for specific 
portfolios of assets or liabilities, there is anecdotal 
evidence that European firms tend to use macro-based 
approaches to hedging, rather than hedging specific assets 
or liabilities. This is reinforced by the European Union’s 
decision to opt out of IAS 39 for hedging. Glaum (2000) 
finds that use of derivatives is related to the European 
firms’ strategic decision to take a more speculative view of 
managing risk on behalf of shareholders than do US firms. 
Thus it is predicted that European firms are less likely to 
be constrained than US firms by hedge accounting rules. 
They are more likely to be prepared to engage in 
speculative risk-management activities by undertaking 
active risk management of exposures through a 
combination of hedged and unhedged risk-management 
instruments. 
H5: European firms are more likely than US firms to 
manage their exposure by using both speculative 
and non-speculative derivatives.
Our final hypothesis concerns the interrelationship of cost 
of capital estimation and the firms’ choice of hedged or 
unhedged interest and/or foreign exchange derivatives 
exposure. Consistent with the adverse selection argument, 
we predict that firms that choose to insure against 
idiosyncratic risk sources by engaging in derivatives 
exposure will have higher cost of capital estimates than 
firms that do not, and we predict the following.
H6: Firms that engage in speculative and/or non-
speculative derivatives exposure will have higher 
cost of capital than firms that do not.
We test these predictions by running regressions for the 
above hypotheses, where relevant, on both hedging and 
combined hedging and unhedged instruments, and then 
comparing the overall goodness of fit of the model for the 
firms in the US and European samples.
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4.1 SAMPLE SizE
Table 4.1 outlines the sample selection process. The 
sample was based on all existing constituents of the FTSE 
Global 500 firms as at 31 December 2006. Constituent 
firms had to have been on the FTSE Global 500 index for 
at least five years, and had all relevant available financial, 
stock market and credit ratings data on Compustat, Global 
Insight and DataStream and Ratings Direct, respectively, to 
qualify for inclusion in the analysis. After deducting financial 
firms, there were 222 industrial firms remaining, 
comprising 133 US firms and 89 European Union firms.9 In 
order to generate a reliable inference, we exclude firms with 
extreme percentiles in return on equity and the Taffler-
Tishaw (TT) measure of liquidity. We excluded, therefore, a 
further 22 US firms and 15 EU firms. After excluding these 
firms, the final sample size was reduced to 111 US firms 
and 74 EU firms.
Table 4.1: Sample selection
Filtered firms
No. of firms in the 
sample
Starting point  450
Financial firms (123)  
Non-financial firms  327
Firms with no 
required data (105)   
Firms with 
insufficient criteria 37  
Final sample size  185
Regional breakdown of the final sample 
US 111  
EU 74  
Total  185
Note: The sample consists of non-financial constituents of the 
FTSE Global 500 firms as of 31 December 2006. Constituent 
firms had to have been included in the FTSE Global 500 index for 
at least five years. In addition, sample firms needed to have all 
available financial, stock market and credit ratings data on 
Compustat Global Insight, DataStream and Ratings Direct, 
respectively, to qualify for inclusion in the analysis. Firms were 
also excluded from the sample if they did not meet the liquidity 
or positive earnings criteria required to exclude alternative tax or 
financial distress incentives for derivatives use.
9.  We excluded APEC firms because of the problems identified in footnote 4.
4.2 STuDy PERiOD
The period of the analysis of the data was from 1 January 
2005 until 31 December 2008. This period allows us to 
analyse the status of financial instruments during the first 
two full financial reporting years when both IAS 32 and IAS 
39 were implemented (ie for annual reporting periods 
beginning on or after 1 January 2005).10 
4.3 RESEARCh DESiGN
4.3.1. Classification of firms’ derivatives use and changes 
in use over time
For the purposes of empirical testing of the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3, firms’ use of derivatives was 
classified primarily in terms of the following criteria: 
the use of derivatives that are qualified for hedging •	
purposes or for non-hedge, trading purposes
the use of either interest rate or currency hedges, or •	
both11
increases or decreases in the amounts of derivatives •	
used during the fiscal years 2005 to 2008,12 and 
whether the firm was US or EU based. •	
The primary purpose of this classification was to derive a 
comparable measure to that used by Zhang (2009), who 
classifies firms as either effective hedgers or ineffective 
speculators depending on the change in type of exposure 
between the first period they were known to initiate a risk 
management programme and the second period, where 
the exposure was defined relative to an ‘expected level’ of 
a given risk. However, Zhang (2009) defined the expected 
level of derivatives use only during the period immediately 
preceding the initiation of the derivatives programme, 
which can vary considerably across firms. Since all EU 
firms were required to adopt IFRS for the first time at the 
2005 year end, and because the euro and the relevant 
interest rate regime were only fully adopted in 2002 in 
most EU states (apart from Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and the UK), and owing to the lack of standard 
GAAP or accounting treatment of financial instruments 
prior to this period, this study adopts the more 
rudimentary ‘increase’ or ‘decrease’ in derivatives use in 
10.  We have not addressed the issue of measurement of changes in 
exposure as a result of changes in interest rates. These disclosures were 
first required to be reported for financial periods for which IFRS 7 is 
effective (ie on or after 1 January 2007) and, therefore, fall outside the 
period of our study.
11.  A number of firms used a combination of interest rates and currency 
swaps, forwards or options. These were classified as foreign currency if the 
base currency was non-domestic to the listing headquarters of the firm, 
and as interest rate otherwise.
12.  For the purposes of analysis, firms which had no derivatives, or where 
derivatives use levels did not change over the period, were classed as 
increasing their use of derivatives. 
4. Sample selection and data collection
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2008. The third full year of mandatory implementation of 
IFRS, relative to ‘period 1’, defined as fiscal year, 2006, ie 
the year immediately preceding the first fiscal year of full 
adoption of IFRS (effective for reporting periods ending on 
or after 31 December 2005, ie in 2006). In this study it is 
therefore assumed that the ‘treatment group’ of EU firms 
initiate their risk-management programmes after foreign 
currency and interest rate harmonisation. For the purposes 
of analysis, the US sample of multinational firms is the 
‘control’ group.
4.3.2 Choice of explanatory control variables
Market-related factors included in x-vector variables 
include beta, book-to-market and idiosyncratic risk, which 
Ferreira and Laux (2007) define as 1 minus the R2 of a 
regression of the market model for firm i in year t, divided 
by R2.13 
Firm-specific risk measures included in y-vector variables 
include the main predicted determinants of derivatives use 
of primary interest to this study (foreign sales).14 A number 
of control variables are included in the standard regression 
analysis. In addition to firm size, which is defined in terms 
of either sales or market capitalisation, we also consider 
various proxies for financial risk, including leverage.15 We 
also measure a proxy for financial distress, which Taffler 
and Tishaw (1977) define as the weighted average of 
various measures of short-term distress.16 
13.  Analogous to the issue raised in footnote 11, it is likely that the market 
model is not a sufficient model to capture idiosyncratic risk for firms 
exposed to significant interest rate and/or foreign currency exposure.
14.  Our measure of foreign sales is taken from the Compustat segmental 
reporting database. The database gives a geographic breakdown of sales. 
For US (EU) firms, we capture both domestic sales as a percentage of total 
sales, EU (US) regional sales, and all non-domestic and non-EU (US) sales. 
The purpose of this is to develop an enhanced measure of the hedge ratio, 
which is discussed in Chapter 5.
15.  Debt covenants can also specify the maximum levels of debt to 
tangible assets (captured by leverage) and maintaining a minimum 
amount of capital expenditure. This second restriction is effectively a 
minimum investment constraint. A capital constraint can serve as a sign of 
impending financial distress. Froot (1995) argues that being able to stay 
within such a constraint may allow a company to invest more in positive 
NPV investments. In unreported tests, we also develop a measure 
concerning the rate of undertaking new investments, which captures the 
incentive to use hedging as way of ensuring a minimum rate of 
undertaking new investments, a second form of financial debt covenant 
that is imposed by lenders in addition to the financial leverage constraint. .
16.  The TT model is a multiple attribute single measure of liquidity risk, 
defined as 53% x (operating profit/current liabilities) + 13% x (current 
assets/total assets) + 8% x (current liabilities/total assets) + 16% x 
((immediate assets – current liabilities)/operating expenses). A range of 
other measures of financial distress could have been used, including the 
classic Altman (1968) z-score model, which indicates the relative 
likelihood that a firm will not go bankrupt. A high TT or Z score indicates 
bankruptcy is less likely. However, full implementation of Altman’s model 
requires identifying a sample of control firms that went bankrupt in the 
past. Insufficient data is available from this sample to perform a full-scale 
z-score analysis.
In vector y variables we also include both pension funding 
ratio of pension assets to projected benefit obligations, 
and the percentage of pension portfolio assets invested in 
‘risky’ asset classes such as equities, property and other 
non-duration liability matched asset classes. The inclusion 
of pension risk and funding ratio is important given that 
many firms have effectively under-funded their defined-
benefit obligations. Firms are more likely to view their 
under-funded defined-benefit schemes as financial 
subsidiaries and treat them from a risk management 
perspective rather than from a corporate finance 
perspective, as is the case for US firms (Picconi 2006). 
Consequently, under this broader capital structure or 
integrated financial perspective, the pension fund is 
equivalent to a non-transferable source of internal risk 
capital (Bodie et al. 1987). This, in turn, may have serious 
first-order consequences for the interest rate and/or 
foreign currency exposure of the (presumably unhedged) 
pension fund assets and liabilities. It can also have 
negative second-order operating cash flow implications 
arising from the need for the corporate sponsor 
multinational firm to ‘top up’ contributions regularly to 
meet any periodic shortfall.17 Whether or not the financial 
slack and/or deficit implied by the pension fund has any 
bearing on the demand for derivatives in an economy 
described in Froot (1995), where incentive problems 
prevail, is an empirical issue; we therefore incorporate 
these measures into our set of y-vector control variables.18
17.  The corporate finance and accounting literature has previously 
treated pension funds as off-balance sheet debt, notwithstanding the 
recent requirement in FRS 17, SFAS 158 (US) and IAS 19 (IFRS) to require 
recognition of deficits or surpluses. Nonetheless, the differential treatment 
accorded to changes in value over time whereby firms can elect to use a 
corridor approach to amortise any shortfall under IAS 19 and US GAAP, 
means that the full funding implications are only observed in the 
footnotes. Coronado et al. (2008) argue that these are insufficient, and 
that analysts regularly under-price pension shortfalls.
18.  Many multinationals in our sample operate multiple pension fund 
schemes for the various geographical regions in which they operate. In 
contrast to previous research, we incorporate all sources of pension 
funding and risk where possible and where disclosed; otherwise we use 
the domestic pension fund. We also incorporate into our pension funding 
measure unfunded health care and related post-employment retirement 
benefits, where these are sufficiently disclosed.
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4.3.3 Surveys and questionnaires
To verify the observed association between derivatives use 
and various explanatory factors, we discuss survey and 
questionnaire evidence to examine the robustness of the 
predictions developed in section 3.2. Specifically, the 
survey and questionnaire examined whether multinational 
EU and US firms: 
experienced significant growth in their monitoring •	
mechanisms
reported trends and determinants of their use of •	
derivatives
reported views on the relevance and salience of •	
derivatives use. 
We provide a brief summary of the survey and interviews 
conducted to further corroborate and clarify the results of 
the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter 5. These 
comprised a survey of derivatives use, and a questionnaire 
concerning management of derivatives by multinational 
firms.
A survey of derivatives use was issued to a sample of 77 
EU firms. The survey was based on the Bodnar et al. 
(2003) survey, which is reproduced in the appendix to 
their paper. The purpose was to establish the use of 
derivatives of a sample of EU firms, from a treasury 
management point of view. The survey was administered 
to small sample of EU firms. 
The response from the questionnaire indicated that most 
firms used derivatives to manage interest rate and foreign 
currency risk. Some firms used derivatives to manage 
commodity risk.
A questionnaire concerning various aspects of their 
internal control departmqent was sent to 40 firms. The 
purpose of the questionnaire was to establish views about 
the adoption of IFRS and its implications for hedge 
accounting. Two responses were received. The responses 
generally supported the predictions.
The pooled, cross-EU and US regression also includes a 
number of institutional and corporate governance 
variables that may explain variations in multinationals’ use 
of derivatives. If, as previously argued in Chapter 3 section 
1, the more sophisticated firms have a relatively greater 
propensity to seek to overcome market imperfections by 
hedging risk, we also predict an association between 
earnings quality, cash flow quality and derivatives use. We 
define earnings quality as the extent to which management 
is able to manipulate reported earnings, which we 
operationalise as the modified Jones discretionary 
accruals measure.19 
The institutional factors include a dummy variable 
representing whether the firm is a manufacturer (=1) or 
not, since manufacturers are likely to be highly exposed to 
foreign currency risk. Other institutional variables include 
GAAP quality, represented by the firm’s use of either US 
GAAP (=1) or IFRS (=0). Quality of accounting GAAP 
application is measured by the extent of discretionary 
accruals (using the modified Jones index). Finally, to study 
the effect of the overall legal environment, a corruption 
index is constructed following Kaufman et al. (2006), who 
define ‘regulatory quality’ as measures of incidence of 
market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or 
inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the 
burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as 
foreign trade and business development.20 
19.  We follow the Dechow et al. (1995) modified Jones (1991) model, 
where abnormal accruals proxy is the residual from a linear regression of 
total accruals on gross property, plant and equipment and change in sales 
minus the change in accounts receivable. The residuals are estimated by 
industry and fiscal year  
 
WCAit  = a0 + a1
 ( ∆REVit – ∆ARit ) + eit 
where WCAit is working capital accruals of firm i in year t, Ait–1 is total 
assets of firm i in year t–1, ∆REVit is the change in revenues of firm i in year 
t; and ∆ARit is the change in accounts receivable of firm i in year t.
20.  We follow the standard approach where US = 7, UK = 5, and other EU 
countries range from 0 to 4. We specify alternatively other well-known 
corruption indices, but do not report the results as they do not affect the 
overall analysis. All z-vector variables, except for discretionary accruals, 
are either industry or country-specific. We rerun the z-vector scores only 
for the combined US and EU samples; these variables will not vary by type 
of derivatives use, and are separately reported for only hedge derivatives 
or hedged and unhedged total derivatives exposure.
Ait–1 Ait–1
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This section reports the results of a descriptive analysis of 
the overall use of derivatives and then provides 
multivariate analysis of the hypotheses.
5.1 DESCRiPTivE STATiSTiCS 
5.1.1 Derivatives use
Our empirical results examine, for a given level of 
disclosure and use, the total value of ‘qualified for hedging’ 
derivatives use. Various measurement bases can be used:
(a) the ratio of notional amount based on historical cost 
(b) fair value of all hedging instruments; and 
(c) a mixture of amortised cost and fair value. 
In addition, hedging instruments can be either to offset 
interest rate risk, or foreign currency risk, or both. Further, 
firms can vary in the extent to which they use derivatives 
for hedging or unhedged risk. Finally, firms can use cash 
flow or fair value hedging, and other types of foreign 
hedging. In this study, we examine only the use of the 
notional value of derivatives, since anecdotal evidence 
suggests that notional values are more robust predictors 
of patterns and trends in derivatives use by firms than fair 
values. This is not surprising given that the reported fair 
value is simply a summarised, netted-off figure. 
Various data were collected on derivatives use by firms in 
each of the two major geographic regions, the US and the 
EU. The data obtained are separated for interest rate and 
foreign currency categories, and are further decomposed 
by notional value and by fair value. There is also separate 
reporting for non-hedged exposures. These data are 
further broken down by designation of instruments 
(hedges or non-hedges), type of cover to primary market 
risks (currency or interest rate), and financial magnitude 
(notional amount versus fair value). We also collect data for 
both qualified for hedging and not-qualified for hedging 
exposure.21 Yearly descriptive statistics for these main 
variables of interest for our samples of US and EU firms 
over the study period 2005–08 are reported in Table 5.1. 
Various data were collected to examine financial 
derivatives use by industrial firms in two major geographic 
regions: the US and Europe. Data are broken down by the 
purpose of derivatives use (hedges or non-hedges), type of 
cover to primary market risks (currency or interest rate), 
and financial magnitude (notional amount versus fair 
value). Variable definitions are set out below.
21.  We did not analyse derivatives use by type of nominated cash fl ow 
versus fair value hedging, since this relates to an accounting (legal) 
distinction rather than a functional, line of business distinction, and has 
implications for the measurement and impact of pension exposure on 
comprehensive versus operating income. 
InterRt-H N = Notional value of derivatives that are used to avert 
interest rate risks, qualified for hedge accounting
InterRt-H FV = Fair value of derivatives that are used to avert 
interest rate risks, qualified for hedge accounting
Forex-H N = Notional value of derivatives that are used to 
avert foreign currency risks, qualified for hedge accounting
Forex-H FV = Fair value of derivatives that are used to avert 
foreign currency risks, qualified for hedge accounting
InterRt-NH N = Notional value of derivatives that are used to 
avert interest rate risks, not qualified for hedge accounting
InterRt-NH FV = Fair value of derivatives that are used to 
avert interest rate risks, not qualified for hedge accounting
Forex-NH N = Notional value of derivatives that are used to 
avert foreign currency risks, not qualified for hedge 
accounting
Forex-NH FV = Fair value of derivatives that are used to avert 
foreign currency risks, not qualified for hedge accounting
Table 5.1 shows that the notional amounts of derivatives 
contracts are much higher than their equivalent reported 
fair values, as we expect it to be, given that the latter are 
merely netted-off summary figures. US firms tend to have 
higher measured interest rate exposure than currency 
exposure, whereas the exposures to interest rate risk and 
currency risk of EU firms to these exposures are relatively 
similar in magnitude. In addition, the US firms have a 
much lower proportion of unhedged derivatives than EU 
firms. Finally, the average level of interest rate exposure is 
much lower and decreasing for US firms, while it is 
increasing for EU firms.22
Figures 5.1–5.4, show various breakdowns of trends in 
derivatives use over time. Panels A and B, respectively, 
show the use and value of notional derivatives disclosures, 
while Panels C and D show the equivalent for fair value 
disclosures. The US sample exhibits higher but declining 
levels of derivatives use, but this increases in 2008. An 
increasing number of European firms are using both types 
of derivatives, and reporting both fair value and notional 
amounts. Interestingly, while US and European firms’ use 
of derivatives is similar, the value is much higher for the 
European firms. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the 
use of derivatives is sufficiently general and pervasive that 
it has an impact on European firms, whereas US firms 
appear to exercise greater discretionary decision over their 
use of derivatives.
22.  Data on US and EU firms are based on common and comparable 
currencies (USD and euro) so analyses of the amounts are fairly comparable. 
5. Empirical results
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics: dependent variables for regression of derivatives use
PANEL A: US firms (133)
InterRt-H N InterRt-H FV Forex-H N Forex-H FV InterRt-NH N InterRt-NH FV Forex-NH N Forex-NH FV
Fiscal year: 2008
Mean 1,220.09 46.16 1,244.92 36.14 12.00 1.04 175.99 0.24
Std dev 3,757.76 396.66 3,293.36 230.96 209.38 177.78 1,178.07 179.66
Fiscal year: 2007
Mean 912.62 –2.51 1,060.20 –7.20 3.52 0.41 89.21 –0.43
Std dev 1,786.89 230.06 3,883.54 57.05 178.15 176.03 377.08 179.66
Fiscal year: 2006
Mean 953.10 –2.86 822.16 –14.73 16.45 0.05 58.74 –0.30
Std dev 1,608.01 50.15 2,032.56 91.48 100.19 1.28 325.51 4.29
Fiscal year: 2005
Mean 895.57 –5.92 704.66 0.27 6.76 –0.04 40.40 –0.42
Std dev 1,630.11 28.03 1,630.45 91.49 50.36 0.73 228.33 6.26
PANEL B: EU firms (89)
InterRt-H N InterRt-H FV Forex-H N Forex-H FV InterRt-NH N InterRt-NH FV Forex-NH N Forex-NH FV
Fiscal year: 2008
Mean 11,942.72 192.55 11,968.42 109.50 35,083.39 118.75 5,322.15 –429.32
Std dev 16,055.17 1,635.26 12,520.48 708.02 107,575.37 341.40 7,051.91 1,803.92
Fiscal year: 2007
Mean 10,266.83 415.40 10,980.41 285.71 36,818.62 161.38 6,371.46 30.70
Std dev 15,484.32 1,763.56 12,966.66 627.58 96,941.87 348.36 6,268.10 125.84
Fiscal year: 2006
Mean 9,349.56 372.18 10,663.03 310.85 31,305.78 394.44 8,925.77 2,044.38
Std dev 9,609.64 1,515.49 10,982.85 811.85 74,627.29 1,186.14 9,796.58 8,044.37
Fiscal year: 2005
Mean 9,817.85 356.45 10,953.73 709.10 45,522.57 599.62 9,152.60 2,338.58
Std dev 10,500.03 1,608.67 13,269.41 3127.79 95,230.69 1,722.07 9,556.33 7,908.87
Notes:
H – hedged in accordance with ‘qualify for hedge accounting treatment’ under FAS 133 or IAS 32/39.
NH – not qualifying for hedge accounting treatment.
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figure 5.1: Trends in derivatives use over time – interest rates (hedged)
5.1(a): use of interest rate (hedged) derivatives –  
notional value









5.1(c): use of interest rate (hedged) derivatives –  
fair value









5.1(b): value of interest rate (hedged) derivatives – 
notional value












5.1(d): value of interest rate (hedged) derivatives –  
fair value
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figure 5.2: Trends in derivatives use over time – interest rates (unhedged)
5.2(a): use of interest rate (unhedged) derivatives – 
notional value









5.2(c): use of interest rate (unhedged) derivatives –  
fair value









5.2(b): value of interest rate (unhedged) derivatives – 
notional value












5.2(d): value of interest rate (unhedged) derivatives –  
fair value












figure 5.3: Trends in derivatives use over time – fX (hedged)
5.3(a): use of fX (hedged) derivatives – notional value









5.3(c): use of fX (hedged) derivatives – fair value









5.3(b): value of fX (hedged) derivatives – notional value












5.3(d): value of fX (hedged) derivatives – fair value
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figure 5.4: Trends in derivatives use over time – fX (unhedged)
5.4(a): use of fX (unhedged) derivatives – notional value









5.4(c): use of fX (unhedged) derivatives – fair value









5.4(b): value of fX (unhedged) derivatives – notional value












5.4(d): value of fX (unhedged) derivatives – fair value













We estimate financial market-related risk including beta, 
and book-to-market. We also consider credit rating, by 
discounting the value of firms’ outstanding long-term debt 
in developing measures of hedging effectiveness (see 
Chapter 3). We develop a measure for firms’ exposure to 
foreign currency risk by obtaining the percentage of 
foreign sales obtained from segmental reporting 
information. 
The variable definitions used in Tables 5.2 to 5.5 are as 
follows.
BETA = Beta of stock return to market index, calculated 
daily over one year
SD = Standard deviation of firm stock returns, calculated 
daily over one year
IDIO = Log of (1- coefficient of determination)/coefficient of 
determination of market model
BTM = Ratio of book value of common equity to market 
value of equity 
LEV = Leverage ratio, equals long-term debt divided by 
long-term debt plus common equity 
SIZE = Market value of equity of stock as at 31 December 
FORS = Percentage of sales to geographically non-
domestic customers
TT = Taffler–Tishaw measure of liquidity
PFUND = Ratio of market value of firm’s sponsored 
defined benefit pension fund assets to projected benefit 
obligation
PRISK = Percentage of firm’s sponsored defined-benefit 
pension fund assets invested in equity and other risky 
assets
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics on the 
independent variables for the pooled samples of US (Panel 
A) firms and EU (Panel B) firms (relating to the four fiscal 
years 2005–08) for tests of hypotheses 1–4 (see Chapter 3). 
The results show an initially increasing but subsequently 
declining book-to-market, firm size, TT ratio, pension 
funding ratio and leverage ratio for both European and US 
firms over time. These trends indicate a significant change 
in the business environment from 2005.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics: independent variables for derivatives use 
PANEL A: US firms (133)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Variable Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
BETA 1.019 0.265 1.032 0.371 0.873 0.231 0.804 0.573
SD 0.231 0.065 0.234 0.077 0.240 0.055 0.027 0.074
IDIO 1.183 0.603 1.381 0.617 0.683 0.637 0.684 0.637
BTM 0.326 0.177 0.321 0.192 0.333 0.251 0.521 0.447
LEV 0.600 2.105 0.450 0.610 0.450 0.183 0.327 0.227
SIZE 52418 56645 54736 63166 61927 69314 44021 53526
FORS 0.327 0.267 0.339 0.268 0.338 0.276 0.559 0.483
TT 0.432 1.283 0.276 1.283 0.513 1.314 –0.120 2.169
PFUND 0.821 0.158 0.892 0.164 0.957 0.167 0.752 0.161
PRISK 70.488 10.747 70.498 11.103 69.204 11.000 64.149 13.784
PANEL B: EU firms (89)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Variable Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
BETA 0.943 0.444 0.928 0.406 0.928 0.406 0.548 0.323
SD 0.063 0.020 0.054 0.014 0.054 0.014 0.063 0.017
IDIO 0.222 0.160 0.224 0.158 0.251 0.195 0.251 0.195
BTM 0.404 0.221 0.367 0.183 0.479 0.386 0.589 0.460
LEV 0.954 1.272 1.209 4.095 0.339 0.212 0.384 0.232
SIZE 50743 67032 57904 73321 62776 77732 50347 75290
FORS 0.612 0.272 0.633 0.272 0.611 0.271 0.640 0.274
TT 0.377 0.330 0.356 0.333 0.153 0.246 0.090 0.219
PFUND 0.685 0.336 0.728 0.373 0.734 0.346 0.713 0.254
PRISK 56.179 18.013 56.526 19.154 59.522 15.294 51.789 18.039
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5.2 CORRELATiON AMONG iNDEPENDENT vARiABLES
The above graphical analysis does suggest variation in 
behaviour of the sample in both the use and extent of 
derivatives between US and EU firms. In order to test the 
hypotheses using multivariate analysis, we use multivariate 
analysis to control for other explanations for derivatives 
use. Table 5.3 reports the correlation among independent 
variables for the sample by both regions. For the US 
sample, there is a consistent generally high positive 
correlation between pension funding ratio and the TT ratio, 
while there is a significant negative correlation between 
book-to-market and financial leverage. None of the other 
variables are significantly correlated with each other. For 
the EU sample, pension fund is significantly positively 
correlated with both pension risk and beta. None of the 
other firm-specific and market-specific variables are 
significantly associated with each other. 
Table 5.3 correlates the independent variables for the 
pooled samples of US firms (Panel A) and EU firms (Panel 
B), relating to the four fiscal years, 2005–08.
When we add the institutional factors into the correlation 
(not reported) we find a significant positive relationship 
between manufacturing firms’ dummy and pension fund 
risk. This is expected, since such firms are more likely to 
underfund their pensions owing to union-based 
arrangements. There is also a positive correlation between 
the corruption index and foreign sales, confirming that the 
firms based in countries with relatively lower governance 
quality are those in smaller continental European countries 
which depend on higher percentages of foreign sales. 
Finally, we also find a significant positive correlation 
between discretionary accruals and leverage, which is 
consistent with the finding in previous research (eg 
Dechow et al. 1995) of a strong linkage between incentives 
to reduce accounting quality via accruals management 
and leverage.
27DERIVATIVES REPORTING PRACTICES BY MULTINATIONALS 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 5.3: Correlations among independent variables
PANEL A: US firms (Pooled 2005–08: n = 520)
Variable BETA SD IDIO BTM LEV SIZE FORS TT PFUND PRISK
BETA 1.000
SD 0.395 1.000
IDIO –0.087 0.335 1.000
BTM 0.080 –0.220 –0.127 1.000
LEV 0.035 0.063 0.012 –0.073 1.000
SIZE –0.058 –0.012 –0.196 –0.206 –0.023 1.000
FORS 0.042 –0.148 –0.114 –0.070 –0.122 0.130 1.000
TT 0.047 0.124 –0.030 –0.120 –0.013 0.141 0.004 1.000
PFUND –0.011 0.192 –0.093 –0.127 0.039 0.040 –0.180 0.108 1.000
PRISK 0.033 0.258 0.101 –0.100 0.056 0.059 –0.194 0.081 0.182 1.000
PANEL B: EU firms (Pooled 2005–08: n = 222)
Variable BETA SD IDIO BTM LEV SIZE FORS TT PFUND PRISK
BETA 1.000
SD 0.533 1.000
IDIO 0.150 0.108 1.000
BTM 0.107 0.240 0.176 1.000
LEV –0.058 –0.040 –0.081 –0.135 1.000
SIZE 0.008 0.117 0.099 –0.075 –0.112 1.000
FORS 0.220 0.219 0.021 0.045 –0.202 0.130 1.000
TT 0.128 –0.074 –0.011 –0.230 0.011 0.273 0.144 1.000
PFUND –0.108 –0.156 0.084 –0.048 0.026 –0.048 –0.027 0.129 1.000
PRISK –0.002 –0.184 –0.078 –0.019 0.042 –0.096 –0.061 0.054 0.066 1.000
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5.3 MuLTivARiATE ANALySiS
Multivariate test results of hypotheses 1 to 5 developed in 
Chapter 3 are reported in Tables 5.4 to 5.8, separately for 
US firms (Panel A) and EU firms (Panel B). We also report 
results for the combined sample of US and EU firms (Table 
5.8, Panel C) to test the predicted effects on derivatives 
use of cross-sectional variation in industry, GAAP use, 
GAAP application (opaqueness) and overall institutional 
corruption, in hypothesis 4 (see page 14). In addition, we 
report the results for both hedged and combined hedged 
and non-hedged derivatives to test predictions concerning 
the propensity of EU firms to use derivatives more 
extensively for trading purposes than US firms, in 
hypothesis 5.
All results are for the pooled sample for fiscal years ending 
2005–08. 
5.3.1 Overall propensity to use derivatives
We first show the results of logistic regressions of the 
propensity to use derivatives. Table 5.4 reports the results. 
This table reports a more detailed breakdown of the 
results of logistic regressions used to test the first 
hypothesis, which predicts an association between the 
propensity for derivatives use and measures of firm risk. 
Results are reported separately for US firms (Panel A) and 
EU firms (Panel B).
The regressions used to test hypotheses 1–5, take the 
following general form.
bit = ai + m1ixit + m2iyit + m3izit + eit (1)
where
bit = level or dummy variable of derivatives use of 
type i,t for firm i in fiscal year t
xit = a vector of variables related to market-related 
risk for firm i in fiscal year t
yit = a vector of variables related to firm-specific risk 
for firm i in fiscal year t
zit = a vector of variables related to institutional, 
cultural or corruption factors (used to test 
hypothesis 5)
Results are derived from pooled data collected for fiscal 
years 2005 to 2008. Apart from derivatives used for 
hedging purposes, we also examine the effect of total 
derivatives use.
We find that the results given in Table 5.4 are largely 
consistent with the overall results reported in the earlier 
tables. In relation to US firms (Panel A), the interest rate 
(hedging only) model appears to indicate that, in addition 
to the standard deviation of stock returns (total firm risk) 
and idiosyncratic risk, the propensity to use foreign 
exchange derivatives is also positively related to size and 
negatively related to pension fund risk. The overall model 
Chi-square statistic and adjusted R-square are also high, 
and consistent with the predictions of hypothesis H1. 
By contrast, the propensity to use interest rate derivatives 
is much more equivocal for European firms (Panel B). Only 
leverage and pension fund risk are positively associated 
with interest rate derivatives use. The use of foreign 
currency derivatives by European firms is positively related 
only to leverage funding ratio, providing support for the 
relationships as predicted hypothesis H1.
Consistent with predictions, there is also a positive 
relationship between the propensity to use derivatives and 
the pension funding ratio, but only for US firms. These 
overall results suggest that for US firms, derivatives use is 
related to financial distress, while for EU firms, derivatives 
use is related to various sources of internal financial risk, 
but not in the way predicted by hypotheses H1a and H2a 
(see page 13). 
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Table 5.4: Logistic regression of decision to use derivatives: breakdown by type of derivative
PANEL A: US firms (Pooled 2005–08)
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
BETA 0.201 0.402 0.028 0.906 0.221 0.358 –0.045 0.850
SD 2.208 0.046 1.721 0.116 2.198 0.047 1.822 0.100
IDIO –0.439 0.005 –0.304 0.046 –0.411 0.008 –0.290 0.058
BTM –0.077 0.813 0.077 0.810 –0.057 0.860 0.074 0.819
LEV –0.106 0.339 0.158 0.382 –0.122 0.314 0.186 0.357
SIZE 0.001 0.282 0.001 0.077 0.000 0.902 0.001 0.029
FORS –0.106 0.696 –0.037 0.890 –0.156 0.564 0.026 0.925
TT –0.036 0.549 –0.023 0.694 –0.038 0.528 –0.025 0.681
PFUND –0.253 0.611 –1.056 0.034 0.017 0.008 –1.353 0.007
PRISK –0.411 0.192 0.008 0.235 –0.483 0.336 0.009 0.173
Chi-Sq 28.177 16.450 30.159 22.766
R-Sq 0.070 0.042 0.075 0.057
PANEL B: EU firms (Pooled 2005–08)
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
BETA 0.004 0.948 –0.277 0.421 0.353 0.282 –0.248 0.500
SD 0.395 0.530 11.526 0.180 –10.263 0.199 –0.651 0.942
IDIO 1.091 0.296 –0.242 0.708 –0.051 0.937 –1.144 0.099
BTM 0.371 0.542 –0.577 0.117 –0.091 0.793 0.360 0.387
LEV 4.432 0.035 0.784 0.005 1.220 0.001 0.625 0.027
SIZE 0.616 0.433 0.000 0.245 0.000 0.336 0.000 0.690
FORS 0.048 0.826 0.692 0.148 0.278 0.556 1.144 0.026
TT 1.395 0.237 –0.203 0.633 –0.084 0.840 0.141 0.763
PFUND 1.070 0.301 0.267 0.464 –0.319 0.379 0.206 0.587
PRISK 0.134 0.714 0.003 0.521 0.005 0.261 0.153 0.806
Chi-Sq 23.328 21.920 28.554 15.707
R-Sq 0.086 0.084 0.106 0.065
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5.3.2 Level of derivatives use
Hypotheses H1b and H2b, respectively (see page 13), 
predict a positive association between the level of interest 
rate and foreign currency derivatives use, and various firm-
specific and market risk factors. Table 5.5 reports the 
results, separately for interest rate and foreign currency 
exposures, for both the US firms (Panel A) and EU firms 
(Panel B). Results are separately reported for interest rate 
and currency derivatives, and for total derivatives use.
The results in Table 5.5 provide greater insight into the 
type and nature of derivatives use by US firms (Panel A) 
and EU firms (Panel B). For US firms, there is a significant 
and positive relationship between the amount of interest 
rate derivatives use and some key financial risk factors. 
While the use of interest rate derivatives is positively 
associated with pension risk, the use of currency 
derivatives by US firms is negatively associated with TT 
funding ratio and pension funding. It is also positively 
associated with foreign sales and size and the pension 
funding ratio. The negative association with the TT ratio is 
consistent with our expectations that derivatives use is 
positively related to financial distress (where a higher TT 
ratio implies a lower probability of bankruptcy).
For EU firms (Panel B), there is a positive association 
between the use of both interest rate and currency 
derivatives with overall firm risk (standard deviation), 
book-to-market ratio, size and a negative association with 
idiosyncratic risk. None of the other factors are statistically 
significantly associated with derivatives use.
For both US and EU firms, the overall F-statistic for the 
models is statistically significant at the 10% level, while the 
model-adjusted R-squares are all greater than 5%. These 
results provide evidence that is consistent with hypotheses 
H2a and H2b. However the nature of these relationships 
varies, both across types of derivative and between US and 
EU firm samples.
31DERIVATIVES REPORTING PRACTICES BY MULTINATIONALS 5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 5.5: Determinants of exposure to derivatives by type of derivative: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
PANEL A: US firms (Pooled 2005–08)
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
CONSTANT 1106.67 0.003 –535.64 0.263 1097.51 0.003 –392.298 0.425
BETA 235.51 0.399 538.658 1.497 244.35 0.382 532.299 1.437
SD –237.93 0.852 –148.47 0.928 –282.96 0.824 –287.383 0.865
IDIO –241.06 0.176 –188.429 0.411 –236.94 0.184 –227.644 0.335
BTM –336.07 0.382 59.186 0.905 –333.22 0.387 54.967 0.914
LEV –12.264 0.900 43.528 0.730 –11.186 0.909 34.081 0,.793
SIZE –0.002 0.299 0.008 0.001 –0.002 0.357 0.008 0.001
FORS –61.608 0.847 1178.09 0.004 –76.680 0.810 1162.66 0.006
TT –6.285 0.928 –160.807 0.074 –7.123 0.919 –168.280 0.069
PFUND –724.87 0.220 –16.964 0.081 12.784 0.090 –13.505 0.177
PRISK 12.667 0.093 2062.86 0,007 –721.506 0.223 1789.41 0.023
F–statistic 0.684 3.931 0.679 3.704
R–Sq 0.001 0.053 0.001 0.050
PANEL B: EU firms (Pooled 2005–08)
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
CONSTANT 2694.03 0.312 –2874.36 0.268 38885.37 2.800 –2890.44 –1.120
BETA –1571.81 0.341 –692.96 0.667 –7459.74 0.388 –751.46 0.640
SD 96957.43 0.017 109846.67 0.006 425681.52 0.046 110746.31 0.005
IDIO –4108.75 0.205 –3635/03 0.260 –25181.33 0.137 –3779.65 0.229
BTM 4266.04 0.017 5667.55 0.001 –1953.45 0.835 5628.03 0.001
LEV 171.341 0.529 60.81 0.819 –27.704 0.985 61.288 0.817
SIZE 0.017 0.048 0.013 0.113 0.027 0.620 0.013 0.108
FORS –5055.45 0.025 1294.58 0.554 –27267.15 0.013 1302.01 0.551
TT –4552.37 0.030 –607.50 0.765 –16717.86 –1.816 –613.32 0.761
PFUND –2169.31 –1.236 1160.65 0.499 250.26 0.028 –42.588 0.044
PRISK 25.427 0.241 –43.505 0.040 –53741.61 –4.561 1302.01 0.551
F–statistic 3.889 3.779 4.752 3.785
R–Sq 0.076 0.073 0.121 0.073
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5.3.3 Propensity to increase use of derivatives over time
We test the predictions of hypothesis H3a using logistic 
regression analysis of changes in derivatives use over time 
for US firms and EU firms. The dependent variable is 
simply whether the firm increases (=1) or decreases (=0) 
the overall use of derivatives between the fiscal years 2005 
and 2008. Independent variables in the regression include 
beta, idiosyncratic risk and changes in the firm-specific 
financial variables examined in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 between 
2005 and 2008. Results are reported in Table 5.6.
For the US firms (Table 5.6, Panel A), no variables are 
associated with either interest rate or foreign currency 
derivatives use. The overall Chi-square statistic and 
pseudo-R-square are also much lower than for the 
equivalent foreign currency derivatives use regression 
results reported in Table 5.5. 
By contrast, there is more insight to be garnered from a 
further breakdown of overall derivatives use of foreign 
currency derivatives by EU firms (Table 5.6, Panel B). The 
propensity to use both hedged and unhedged foreign 
currency derivatives is positively related to changes in firm 
leverage and TT ratio. These results provide further 
important insights into how traces of the integrated 
corporate finance perspective affect the use of derivatives 
by multinational firms, as specified in hypothesis H3a.
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Table 5.6: Logistic regression of propensity to increase use of derivatives
PANEL A: US firms (Pooled 2005–08)
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
BETA –0.198 0.553 –0.097 0.771 –0.170 0.641 0.440 0.166
SD –0.053 0.979 2.738 0.184 0.611 0.775 –0.208 0.911
IDIO –0.104 0.797 –0.426 0.261 –0.227 0.617 –0.397 0.302
BTM 0.843 0.138 –0.264 0.627 1.347 0.042 –0.340 0.529
LEV 0.232 0.670 0.134 0.739 0.328 0.670 0.088 0.759
SIZE 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.144
FORS –0.538 0.557 0.248 0.775 –0.870 0.407 –0.933 0.294
TT –0.057 0.597 0.021 0.818 –0.064 0.612 –0.072 0.467
PFUND 0.016 0.131 2.004 0.177 0.010 0.402 0.006 0.531
PRISK –1.134 0.478 –0.272 0.502 –1.228 0.499 2.103 0.160
Chi-Sq 7.136 9.907 7.939 8.751
R-Sq 0.713 0.073 0.059 0.065
PANEL B: EU firms (Pooled 2005–08)
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
BETA 0.973 0.160 –0.747 0.274 –0.350 0.483 –0.437 0.509
SD –14.056 0.297 10.809 0.440 7.702 0.559 0.235 0.987
IDIO 2.903 0.078 2.302 0.159 2.089 0.177 3.807 0024.
BTM –0.284 0.636 –0.842 0.199 –0.519 0.379 –0.752 0.224
LEV 0.183 0.439 1.102 0.022 0.175 0,419 –0.013 0.949
SIZE 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.854 0.000 0.245
FORS 2.001 0.290 –1.580 0.433 2.386 0.204 –0.916 0.637
TT 0.338 0.621 1.887 0.058 0.160 0.807 1.223 0.122
PFUND 0.008 0.570 0.492 0.569 1.104 0.280 0.500 0.556
PRISK 0.047 0.904 0.016 0.283 0.011 0.435 0.013 0.382
Chi-Sq 11.150 21.891 8.219 12.869
R-Sq 0.159 0.218 0.118 0.231
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Table 5.7: OLS regression: increase in use of derivatives 
PANEL A: US firms (Pooled 2005–08)
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
BETA 81.252 0.880 158.62 0.533 35.238 0.948 14.968 0.963
SD –475.88 0.878 581.26 0.693 –350.80 0.910 1352.40 0.463
IDIO –659.31 0.308 –86.837 0.777 –662.22 0.306 783.007 0.839
BTM 355.604 0.694 –331.55 0.441 368.91 0.684 –323.730 0.549
LEV –34.811 0.842 –6.380 0.939 –34.911 0.842 10.692 0.918
SIZE 0.002 0.848 –0.004 0.487 0.002 0.850 –0.003 0.656
FORS –811.768 0.573 –647.330 0.343 –854.23 0.553 –437.578 0.609
TT –27.993 0.857 –28.375 0.701 –24.627 0.874 –19.451 0.834
PFUND 5.222 0.763 2.301 0.780 5.779 0.739 3.788 0.714
PRISK 3302.66 0.524 566.527 0.629 1935.295 0.434 260.029 0.850
F-statistic 0.251 0.306 0.256 0.222
R-Sq 0.001 0.024 0.001 0.001
PANEL B: EU firms (Pooled 2005–08)
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest Rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
BETA 3189.48 0.679 866.51 0.676 1615.60 0.870 –3402.74 0.339
SD –6248.33 0.948 –3402.88 0.063 –90160.65 0.655 135436.62 0.065
IDIO 21545.31 0.040 135443.779 0.063 7640.78 0.724 14656.19 0.063
BTM 9.359 0.998 14656.79 0.519 –263.34 0.975 –1863.66 0.539
LEV 372.23 0.794 –1863.80 0.363 –686.61 0.818 981.49 0.363
SIZE –0.009 0.782 981.61 0.809 –0.013 0.845 –0.006 0.809
FORS 1871.67 0.886 –0.006 0.621 717.58 0.979 4878.90 0.621
TT 3398.31 0.475 5974.87 0.098 –7063.58 0.478 5974.82 0.098
PFUND –5347.81 0.360 839.23 0.845 –20222.11 0.094 839.40 0.845
PRISK 66.330 0.497 –0.609 0.993 39.842 0.845 –0.608 0.993
F-statistic 0.717 1.050 0.415 1.050
R-Sq 0.001 0.410 0.001 0.006
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Table 5.7 reports the results of the changes in the levels of 
derivatives use over time. The results are consistent with 
those reported in Table 5.6.
For US firms (Table 5.7, Panel A), there is no relationship 
between the level of increase in derivatives use over time 
and any predictive factor. This suggests a capital-
constrained motivation for use of derivatives by US firms, 
consistent with hypothesis H3b. For European firms, 
however, there is a positive relationship between increase 
in derivatives use and change in idiosyncratic risk. 
5.3.4 Cultural effects
It is important to gain further insight into the potential 
incremental impact of institutional and cultural variations 
in sources of demand for derivatives use by US versus EU 
multinationals discussed above. Table 5.8 reports a more 
detailed breakdown of the results of logistic regressions 
used to test the first hypothesis reported in Table 5.4, 
which predicts an association between the propensity for 
derivatives use and measures of firm risk. Results are 
reported for an aggregated sample of US and EU firms. 
Panels A to D of Table 5.8 also report the propensity to use 
derivatives by the pooled sample of EU and US firms. For 
Panel A, US firms and the corruption index of regulatory 
quality are important determinants of the demand for 
derivatives. In addition, pension funding and pension risk 
variables are robust to the inclusion of these variables in 
explaining the propensity to hedge. The overall Chi-square 
and R-square of Panel A is also considerably higher than it 
is for Panels A and B of Table 5.4, suggesting that the 
institutional factors are adding explanatory power to the 
model. These results support hypothesis H4 (see page 14).
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Table 5.8: Detailed breakdown of the results of logistic regressions used to test the first hypothesis reported in Table 5.4
Panel A: Logistic regression of decision to use derivatives: breakdown by type of derivatives – combined US and EU firms
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
MANU –0.677 0.000 0.062 0.739 –0.616 0.001 0.132 0.409
US –0.702 0.062 –0.707 0.035 –1.038 0.001 –0.493 0.132
CORRUPT –0.167 0.007 –0.208 0.002 –0.116 0.074 –0.105 0.132
DISCACC 0.189 0.842 0.249 0.099 0.242 0.794 0.511 0.599
BETA 0.126   0.486 0.162 0.370 0.128 0.491 –0.155 0.416
SD 2.203 0.039 0.957 0.327 2.415 0.018 2.129 0.037
IDIO –0.429 0.005 –0.257 –0.073 –0.431 0.004 –0.308 0.034
BTM –0.122 0.603 0.004 0.987 –0.388 0.333 0.151 0.549
LEV 0.085 0.282 –0.003 0.944 0.050 0.605 0.365 0.029
SIZE 0.002 0.299 0.001 0.443 0.002 0.132 0.001 0.187
FORS –0.022 0.973 –0.210 0.363 0.024 0.918 0.251 0.298
TT –0.060 0.520 –0.003 0.959 –0.048 0.442 –0.019 0.738
PFUND 0.020 0.003 –0.004 0.201 0.011 0.001 –0.007 0.116
PRISK 0.009 0.039 0.005 0.271 0.009 0.042 0.007 0.116
Chi-Sq 58.780 43.654 73.669 74,594
R-Sq 0.087 0.066 0.109 0.001
Panel B: OLS regression – combined EU and US firms 
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
CONSTANT 4796.89 0.001 1169.52 0.029 3518.48 0.204 1154.79 0.031
MANU –220.166 0.582 –6273.62 0.01 –14040.16 0.011 –6112.75 0.001
US –4151.149 0.001 –519.72 0.015 –5040.57 0.001 –529.44 0.013
CORRUPT –1074.75 0.001 –2600.33 0.399 –25143.63 0.112 –2862.39 0.361
DISCACC –1293.74 0.677 266.07 0.670 –3310.46 0.304 250.15 0.689
BETA –559.13 0.372 3955.95 0.250 19610.91 0.268 3812.35 0.267
IDIO –514.32 0.307 –491.52 0.328 –3056.52 0.230 –527.12 0.295
BTM 2346.93 0.004 3104.44 0.001 –1021.0 –0.243 3072.35 0.001
LEV 211.972 0.170 99.95 0.516 786.96 0.322 99.010 0.521
SIZE 0.007 0.061 0.013 0.001 0.005 0.799 0.013 0.001
FORS –1141.29 0.156 1503.09 0.061 –13958/40 0.001 1508.43 0.061
TT –172.898 0.396 –180.66 0.374 –1022/16 0.330 –188.44 0.355
PFUND 37.020 0.013 5.250 0.624 –14.956 0.787 5.699 0.596
PRISK –0.959 0.928 –34.080 0.022 235/61 0.002 –33.009 0.026
F-statistic 7.002 8.743 4.63 8.450
R-Sq 0.088 0.111 0.059 0.107
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Panel C: Logistic regression of propensity to increase use of derivatives – combined EU and US firms
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and not for 
hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
MANU –0.277 0.376 0,447 0,174 –0.313 0.338 0.281 0.377
US –0.988 0.059 –0.246 0.642 –1.147 0.046 –0.498 0.325
CORRUPT –0.080 0.507 0.087 0.522 0.096 0.506 0.151 0.200
DISCACC 0.353 0.837 5.772 0.005 1.297 0.462 5.167 0.009
BETA 0.197 0.503 –0.103 0.714 0.098 0.738 0.327 0.223
SD –1,515 0,453 2,966 0.135 –0.242 0.906 –0.169 0.652
DBTM 0.054 0.088 –0.410 0.313 0.133 0.764 –0.328 0.406
IDIO 0.239 0.535 –0.314 0.396 0.251 0.494 0.049 0.711
LEV 0.227 0.296 –0.410 0.303 0.240 0.243 0.000 0.120
SIZE 0.000 0,834 0.650 0.030 0.001 0.906 –0.781 0.316
FORS 9,196 0.893 0.001 0.065 0.006 0.994 –0.055 0.565
TT –0.075 0.460 –0.177 0.823 –0.088 0.449 0.009 0.010
PFUND 0.013 0.217 0.022 0.057 0.008 0.479 0.006 0.652
PRISK 0.008 0.558 0.017 0.277 0.011 0.414 0.016 0.284
Chi-Sq 10,703 30.901 21.275 19.526
R-Sq 0.066 0.179 0.092 0.116
Panel D: OLS regression: increase in use of derivatives – combined EU and US firms
Interest rates Foreign currency Interest rates Foreign currency 
(Hedging  
only)
 (Hedging  
only)
(Hedging and not for 
hedging)
(Hedging and  
Not for hedging)
Variable Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value Coeff p-value
MANU –190.67 0.926 3645.32 0.001 –50.060 0.987 22.888 0.984
US 784.73 0.600 1169.52 0.029 –807.22 0.867 270.11 0.822
CORRUPT –381.00 0.874 –6273.62 0.000 –741.04 0.512 –19.836 0.965
DISCACC 430.00 0.765 –519.73 0.016 –3099.67 0.859 6813.73 0.268
BETA –2650.92 0.744 –2600.33 0.399 –976.03 0.704 379.51 0.694
SD –4832.75 0.562 266.07 0.670 1214.78 0.942 856.66 0.782
IDIO 1038.31 0.545 –491.50 0.328 –182.31 0.948 1294.72 0.318
BTM –40.049 0.982 3104.44 0.001 –349.555 0.922 –568.59 0.670
LEV 192.29 0.658 99.947 0.517 –98.20 0.910 218.09 0.507
SIZE –0.004 0.843 0.013 0.001 –0.006 0.852 –0.006 0.643
FORS 804.07 0.222 1503.09 0.061 138.78 0.987 1013.97 0.712
TT 28.093 0.066 –180.66 0.374 –169.16 0.842 50.920 0.874
PFUND –5.339 0.911 5.250 0.625 10.403 0.914 –0.197 0.996
PRISK 75.119 0.249 –34.080 0.022 13.933 0.916 –5.153 0.916
F-statistic 0.225 9.732 0.050 0.244
R-Sq 0.001 0.111 0.003 0.016
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Table 5.8, Panel B shows that US firms are less likely to 
use hedged foreign currency derivatives. The book-to-
market, size and pension risk factors are positively 
associated with interest rate and foreign exchange 
derivatives use, suggesting that these factors remain 
robust to the inclusion of additional cultural and 
institutional controls. 
Panel C of Table 5.8 demonstrates that the level of use of 
foreign currency (hedged and/or non-hedged) derivatives 
is greater for non-US GAAP firms, and is positively related 
to the corruption index and the exercise of discretionary 
accruals. The overall Chi-square statistic is higher than for 
either US or European firms. 
These results suggest that companies based in common 
law countries (ie US and UK) are more associated with 
extensive total interest rate derivatives use than those 
based in civil code law (ie Continental European) countries. 
Further, both market and firm financial risk factors (book-
to-market) are positively associated with interest rates 
qualified for hedging derivatives. These results lend further 
support to the predictions of hypotheses H2a and H2b, 
respectively, which suggest that the amount of derivatives 
use is associated with firm-specific financial factors, even 
after controlling for other market and institutional factors 
associated with derivatives use. 
Taken together, the results of the pooled analysis in Table 
5.8 support hypothesis H4. However, the industry factor 
does not appear to be influential. 
Discretionary accruals is positively associated with the 
propensity to increase foreign currency derivatives over 
time (Table 5.8, Panel C). The results in Table 5.8 therefore 
support the earlier results by suggesting that firms are less 
likely to be influenced by cross-sectional variations in 
institutional frameworks and regulatory environments in 
making relatively short-term changes to their derivatives 
use strategies. By contrast, no institutional factors affect 
changes in the level of total hedge derivatives over time, as 
reported in Table 5.8, Panel D. Thus, the results remain 
equivocal on this issue and suggest that institutional 
factors are not strongly related to changes in derivatives 
use, although they do contribute to explaining overall 
usage of derivatives during the period.
Speculative effects
Hypothesis H5 predicts that European firms are more 
likely to consider the use of derivatives more broadly than 
US firms, for risk management purposes. To test these 
predictions, we expect to find that derivatives use is more 
likely to be strongly associated with a broader range of 
factors, and that the explanatory power of the overall 
model will be higher for EU firms than the equivalent 
model for hedging derivatives use alone.
This requires a comparison of the results discussed above, 
which focus on qualified for hedging derivatives only, with 
the equivalent results for total (hedged and unhedged) 
derivatives, reported in the columns at the right-hand side 
of these tables. 
Table 5.4 appears to suggest that, at least for EU firms 
(Panel B), only book-to-market is significantly (and 
negatively) associated with the use of total (hedged and 
unhedged) derivatives. For the pooled sample (Panel C of 
Table 5.8), the use of total (hedged and unhedged) 
derivatives is mainly related only to institutional factors 
(US GAAP and corruption). The overall model Chi-square 
statistics and R-squares are also significantly lower for the 
total (hedged and unhedged) derivatives regressions than 
for the equivalent qualified for hedging derivatives 
regressions. Thus the predictions implied by hypothesis 
H5 are not supported, at least in analysing the propensity 
of EU firms to use derivatives. 
By contrast, the predictions are more strongly supported 
when the sample is analysed by the total amount of 
derivatives use by type (see Table 5.5). For the use of 
foreign currency derivatives by EU firms (Panel B), the 
same factors that are associated with the use of hedged 
derivatives are also associated with total derivatives use. 
The overall model F-statistics and adjusted R-square are 
also higher. These findings contrast with the relatively 
lower explanatory power of the equivalent regressions for 
interest rate derivatives, and for US firms, as expected. The 
increased explanatory power of the pooled regression 
(Table 5.8, Panel C) mirrors that obtained for the EU firms 
alone (Table 5.5, Panel B). These results suggest that, at 
least in relation to the use of foreign currency derivatives, 
EU firms are likely to use a broader range of (hedged and 
unhedged) derivatives to manage their economic exposure, 
as predicted by hypothesis H5.
Analysis of the propensity to increase the use of total 
(hedged and unhedged) derivatives over time (Table 5.7, 
Panel B) provides even stronger evidence that EU firms 
use a broader range of derivatives for economic reasons 
than do US firms. Panel B of Table 5.6 indicates that 
idiosyncratic risk is associated with the increase in the use 
of foreign exchange derivatives.
Nonetheless, when the equivalent analysis is performed for 
changes in the total level of derivatives use by EU firms 
(Table 5.7, Panel B), there is a significantly higher 
explanatory power of firm risk and idiosyncratic risk only 
for total foreign currency derivatives use. In this case, 
idiosyncratic risk is positively associated with increases in 
the level of derivatives use by EU firms. Again, the 
significant increase in explanatory power in the regressions 
related to the changes in the propensity and level of use of 
derivatives, also contrast with the relatively lower 
explanatory power of analysing derivatives use by US 
firms. The results further support the predictions of 
hypothesis H5 (see page 14). They also provide strong 
support for the predictions of hypothesis H3 (see page 13), 
at least for EU firms. 
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To control for potential biases caused by infrequent 
trading, the CAPM beta is also estimated using the widely 
accepted sum-beta approach, based on the following 
augmented regression (3).
rit – rft = ait + bi0 (rmt – rft) + bi1 (rmt–1 – rft–1) + eit  (3)
The estimated sum beta coefficient is obtained by 
adding the contemporaneous and lagged beta 
estimates from equation (3), ie bi = bi0 + bi1
6.1.2 The fama–french Three-factor (ff3f) Model
Fama and French (1995), provide evidence that the CAPM 
does not provide an adequate explanation of the cross-
sectional variation in average stock returns. They find that 
a three-factor model – which retains the CAPM risk-
premium for systematic market risk but adds risk premia 
for two additional factors to capture the effects of firm size 
and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) ratio – provides a 
much better explanation of the cross-sectional variation in 
stock returns. The implication of their results is that 
reliance on the CAPM overlooks significant common risk 
factors that play a role in determining expected stock 
returns and thus is likely to lead to inaccurate cost of 
capital estimates.
Accordingly, we also estimate the cost of capital using the 
FF3F model.
The FF3F formula for the cost of capital is shown in 
equation (4).
E(ri) = rf + bmi[E(rm) – rf] + bsiSMB + bbpiHML (4)
where 
bsi= firm i’s beta coefficient for the size factor
SMB = the expected market risk premium for firm 
size
bhi = firm i’s beta coefficient for the book-to market 
(BE/ME) equity factor 
HML = the expected market risk premium for the 
book-to-market (BE/ME) equity factor
6. Estimating the cost of capital 
In this chapter, we test hypothesis H6 (see page 14) by 
developing cost of capital estimates, using various 
methodologies, for US and EU firms which either did or did 
not use interest rate or foreign exchange derivatives. Cost 
of capital estimates are developed for firms which are 
partitioned as to whether or not they used derivatives, and 
the extent to which they used the derivatives. Tests are 
conducted separately for hedged only, and hedged and 
unhedged derivatives use. T-tests are then used to infer 
the statistical significance of the findings.
6.1. COST Of CAPiTAL METhODOLOGiES
This section outlines the cost of capital estimation 
methodologies utilised in this part of the paper. The 
discussion briefly summarises each model and provides 
details of the estimation techniques; the reader should 
refer to Cummins and Philips (2005) for a more extensive 
discussion of the various approaches that are used in this 
section to estimate the cost of equity capital.
6.1.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
The CAPM cost of capital is given by formula (2).
E(ri) = rf + bi[E(rm) – rf]  (2)
where E(ri) = the CAPM cost of capital for firm i
rf = the expected return on a default risk-free rate 
asset
E(rm) = the expected return on the market portfolio
bi = firm i’s ‘beta coefficient’ for systematic market 
risk
The CAPM cost of capital estimation is conducted using 
the usual two-stage approach. In the first stage, returns on 
specific stocks in the sample are regressed on a market 
risk factor proxied by an index return to obtain the beta 
coefficient for each firm. In the second stage, the beta 
coefficients are inserted into equation (2) along with the 
estimated market risk premium to obtain the cost of 
capital estimate for each firm. The estimated market 
premium for systematic risk, E(rm) – rf, is the average 
value-weighted excess return on NYSE stocks relative to 
the 30-day Treasury Bill Rate from 1926 to 2006.
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The size factor controls for the ‘small stock effect’ – the 
tendency of stocks with small market capitalisation to have 
higher costs of capital than large capitalisation stocks. The 
book-to-market equity factor is usually interpreted as a 
‘value factor’ or measure of a firm’s growth prospects. 
Firms with high growth prospects tend to have relatively 
low BE/ME ratios and lower costs of capital than firms with 
relatively low growth prospects. The BE/ME factor is also 
often interpreted as providing a market risk premium for 
financial distress (Fama and French 1995). 
The first stage regression in the Fama–French (FF3F) 
methodology is given in equation (5).
 (5)
rit – rft = ai + bmi(rmt – rft) + bsiSMBt + bbpiHMLt + eit
where 
SMBt = return differential between small and large 
stocks in period t
HMLt = return differential between high BE/ME 
stocks and low BE/ME stocks in period t
The model augments the CAPM regression to include 
variables representing market excess returns for size and 
financial distress, based on the differential returns 
between ‘small’ and ‘large’ stocks and ‘high’ and ‘low’ BE/
ME stocks, respectively. These return series are derived 
using the procedures described in Fama and French 
(1995).
As in the case of the CAPM, it is also important to correct 
for infrequent trading bias when estimating the FF3F 
model. Accordingly, we also calculate FF3F beta estimates 
using a sum beta regression which includes 
contemporaneous and lagged values of each of the 
Fama–French return series. Analogous to equation (3), 
sum beta estimates are then obtained by summing the 
betas of the contemporaneous and lagged returns for each 
of the three factors.
In the second stage of the FF3F methodology, we insert 
either the betas from equation (5) or the corresponding 
sum beta estimates into equation (4). The risk-premium 
for systematic market risk, E(rm) – rt, in the FF3F model is 
the same estimate used for the CAPM. Also used in this 
stage are estimates of the long-term average market risk 
premia for size and financial distress. The averaging period 
for the size and financial distress premia is 1926–2006.
6.1.3 The full-information industry Beta (fiB) method
The FIB methodology produces cost of capital estimates 
that reflect the line-of-business composition of the firm. 
Such estimates can be used to estimate costs of capital by 
line of business, for divisions or subsidiaries of 
conglomerate firms. The FIB approach is particularly 
relevant where, as in this case, firms sell goods in the 
domestic market, the US and/or EU markets, and in the 
other non-US and non-EU markets. The underlying 
premise is that the firm can be envisioned as a portfolio of 
assets, where the assets represent divisions or individual 
lines of business. The rationale for the FIB decomposition 
is the value-additivity property of arbitrage-free capital 
markets, which holds that the arbitrage-free market value 
of the firm is the sum of the values of its individual 
projects. This conceptualisation implies that the firm’s 
overall market beta coefficient is a weighted average of the 
beta coefficients of the separate divisions or business 
lines. In theory, the weight on each divisional or line-of-
business beta is the market value of the division divided by 
the market value of the firm as a whole. Because individual 
business units are not publicly traded, however. market 
value weights cannot be used. Instead, we follow Kaplan 
and Peterson (1998) in using sales data to represent 
business participation.
We seek to decompose the overall market beta coefficient 
(for the CAPM) or coefficients (for the FF3F model) into 
separate beta coefficients for each industry in which firms 
participate. There are two steps in the decomposition: (1) 
estimate the overall market beta coefficients for a sample 
of firms using the CAPM or FF3F methods, as discussed 
above; (2) obtain full information betas (FIBs) for each 
industry by performing cross-sectional regressions with 
the overall market betas as dependent variables and a 
series of weights proxying for the firm’s participation in 
various lines of business as explanatory variables. We also 
use Dhaliwal et al.’s (1999) beta (adjusted by accounting 
beta) as a dependent variable in unreported tests. 
The regression equation for the CAPM beta, estimated with 
constant term suppressed, is as follows.
bmi = Σ bmjf  wij + vmi  (6)
where 
bmi = firm i’s overall market systematic risk beta 
coefficient
bmjf  = the full-information market systematic risk 
beta for industry, line or division j
wij = firm i’s industry participation weight for 
industry, line or division j
vmi = random error term for firm i
j
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The wij, j = 1,2,…, j for firm i, which sum to 1.0, measure 
the firm’s participation in each line of business. Revenues 
by industry are used to calculate wij, ie wij = revenues of 
firm i in industry j divided by total revenues of firm i. The 
bmjf  which vary by industry but not by firm, capture the 
impact that any particular line of business is expected to 
have on the overall riskiness and hence the beta coefficient 
of the firm. Equation (6) is then used ‘out of sample’ to 
estimate the overall beta coefficients bmjf  for individual 
divisions or lines of business by inserting the wij weights 
for the division or business line.
A novel approach is to use accounting beta to estimate 
‘portfolio’ weights here; ie regress bacc_i = bacc_j wij . That is, 
use this wij to replace ratio of sales of firm_i’s division_j to 
total sales of firm_i. The second step can be the same as 
before, ie decompose aggregated beta to divisional beta 
based on wij.
Using equation (6) would not be appropriate to decompose 
the FF3F size and book-to-market betas because these 
betas tend to vary systematically with firm size and 
book-to-market ratio, respectively. Specifically, the size 
betas are inversely related to firm size, and the BE/ME 
betas are directly related to firm BE/ME ratios. 
Accordingly, regressions analogous to (6) for the size and 
book-to-market betas would be likely to suffer from 
omitted variables bias. To address this problem, we 
conduct the following regressions for the size and BE/ME 
betas to control two additional risk factors (wij based on 
accounting beta as above is also used in the following 
regressions (7) and (8). 
bsi = Σ bsjf1 wij + bsf2 1n(MEi) + vsi  (7)
bbpi = Σ bbpjf1 wij + bbpf2  1n(BE / MEi) + vbpi  (8)
where 
bsi , bbpi = overall size and BE/ME beta estimates 
firm i
bsjf1, bbpjf1 = full-information size and BE/ME beta 
intercept coefficients for industry j
bsf2 , bbpf2 = full-information size and BE/ME beta slope 
coefficients
BEi, MEi = book value of equity and market value of 
equity for firm i,
vsi, vbpi, = random error terms for firm i, equation j
Equations (7) and (8) allow for different intercept 
coefficients for each industry and also allow the slope 
coefficients to vary by the log of market equity and the log 
of the BE/ME ratio, respectively. The full-information beta 
estimates for the size factor are obtained using the 
estimated coefficients bsjf1 and bsf2 by inserting the industry 
participation weights (wij) and 1n(MEi) for a given firm into 
equation (7), and the full-information beta for the BE/ME 
factor is obtained similarly using equation (8).
Equations (6)–(8) are estimated using two techniques – 
unweighted least squares (UWLS) and weighted least 
squares (WLS). In the WLS estimations, the weight for each 
firm in a specified cross-sectional regression is the ratio of 
its market capitalisation to the total market capitalisation 
of the firms in the sample. For both the UWLS and WLS 
cases, we estimate the three FF3F regressions using the 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) procedure to 
improve estimation efficiency. The weighted and 
unweighted FIB regressions for the CAPM are conducted 
using ordinary least squares.
When UWLS is used to estimate equations (6)–(8), the Bfjk 
represent market value weighted industry betas (Kaplan 
and Peterson 1998). The equally weighted results are 
useful in obtaining an indication of the betas for the 
average firm in an industry, whereas the market value 
weighted (WLS) results are a more useful indicator of the 
overall cost of capital for an industry.
6.2 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTiON
To estimate the CAPM, FF3F and full-information costs of 
capital, we need data on stock returns and revenues by 
line of business for a sample of EU and US firms. This 
section describes the data sources, sample selection 
procedures, and data screens employed to construct our 
sample. In this report, we estimate full-information costs of 
capital for stratified samples of pension-exposed industrial 
EU and US firms identified in our sample, over the period 
2005–08. Stock return data were obtained from 
Compustat. Data were obtained for the period 2001–08, 
permitting us to estimate costs of capital for the full study 
period, because we follow the standard procedure of using 




This section begins by discussing summary statistics on 
the industry participation ratios of the firms. The overall 
beta and cost of capital estimation results are then 
presented, followed by cost of capital estimates by line.
In all the cost of capital estimates presented in this report, 
we use as the risk-free rate the average of the 30-day 
Treasury bill over the years used in this study. Likewise, as 
the expected risk premia for systematic market risk, size 
and financial distress, we use the long-run historical 
(1926–2000) market risk premia on NYSE stocks from 
French’s website.23 We use the same risk-free rate and risk 
premia for all cost of capital estimates to focus on the 
impact of the models and the beta coefficients on the cost 
of capital, holding constant the risk-free rate and market 
risk premia.
The various panels of Tables 6.1–6.3 show the CAPM costs 
of capital based on the beta estimates for both little-
exposed and highly-exposed EU firms in terms of: 
(a)  use of interest rate derivatives
(b) use of foreign exchange derivatives
(c) extent of exposure to hedged FX derivatives
(d) extent of exposure to hedged interest rate derivatives
(e) extent of exposure to hedged and unhedged FX 
derivatives, and 
(f) extent of exposure to hedged and unhedged interest 
rate derivatives.
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) cost of capital 
estimates are shown in Table 6.1. This table shows the 
average CAPM beta for firms that are identified as insurers 
on the basis of their having overall financial code 52. Both 
beta and sum beta regressions are conducted for each 
firm (equations (2) and (3) above). The beta regression is 
as shown in equation (9).
(rit – rft) = ai + Bmi(rmt – rft) + eit   (9)
where 
rit is the return on firm i
rft is the 30-day Treasury bill (T-bill) rate observed at 
the beginning of the month
rmt is the value-weighted market return on all NYSE 
stocks 
23. http://www.french.com
The ‘sum B’ model adjusts for non-synchronous trading by 
adding to the regression the excess market return variable 
lagged one time period. The reported sum betas equal the 
sum of the contemporaneous and lagged beta estimates. 
The data period for each year ends on 30 June. Estimates 
are calculated using the previous 60 months of returns. 
The risk-free rate of interest used to estimate the cost of 
equity capital was the average European Central Bank 
(ECB) 30-day T-bill rate over the time period for this study, 
2005–08, 4.93%. The long-run historical market risk 
premium as of December 2003 was 8.44% (Ibbotson 
2005). Standard deviations are shown in brackets. The 
t-test shows the significance of the difference between a 
purely domestic investor and an investor based either in 
the United States (US Dollars or USD), Eurozone (Euro or 
EUR), UK (GB pound or GBP) and Switzerland (Swiss Franc 
or CHF). 
Table 6.1 also gives the average beta and sum beta by 
market capitalisation size quartile for each year of the 
estimation period. The cost of capital estimate for the 
period as a whole is 3.6% without the sum beta 
adjustment and up to 5.5% with the sum beta adjustment, 
depending on the currency denomination of the investor.
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Table 6.1: CAPM costs of capital for Eu and uS firms
Panel A: EU Firms
Type of exposure
Extent of 




















































T-test pval 0.628 0.048 0.079 0.063 0.075
























T-test pval 0.661 0.448 0.430 0.442 0.443
























T-test pval 0.905 0.807 0.414 0.672 0.443
Extent of 
























T-test pval 0.533 0.546 0.560 0.520 0.565
Extent of interest 





































T-test pval 0.059 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.180
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Panel B: US Firms
Type of exposure
Extent of 



















































T-test pval 0.233 0.215 0.908 0.221 0.206
























T-test pval 0.110 0.799 0.043 0.786 0.827
























T-test pval 0.110 0.410 0.517 0.374 0.433
Extent of 
























T-test pval 0.622 0.397 0.421 0.374 0.438
Extent of 






































Domestic v global na 0.024 0.836 0.006 0.088
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For EU firms (Table 6.1, Panel A), there is a significant 
difference between the overall use of derivatives (FX and 
interest rate, hedged) between users and non-users of 
derivatives. By contrast, for US firms (Panel B), while the 
overall average CAPM estimate based on EUR, GBP and 
CHF is significantly different from the domestic-based 
estimate, there is no overall significant relationship 
between the size of the exposure and the cost of capital, 
except for domestic-denominated exposure.
Table 6.2 provides the equivalent overall cost of capital 
estimates based on the FF3F method. This table shows the 
average regression coefficients from the Fama–French 
three-Factor Model for firms which are identified as EU 
firms. Both beta and sum beta regressions (equations (5) 
and (6) on page 40) are estimated for each firm. The beta 
regression is shown in equation (10).
(rit – rft) = ai + Bm(rmt – rit) + Bsipst + Bhipht + eit  (10)
where 
rit is the return on firm i
rft is the 30-day Treasury bill rate observed at the 
beginning of the month
rmt is the value-weighted market return on all NYSE 
stocks
The firm size and BE/ME factors, pst and pht, respectively, 
are determined as follows. At the end of June of each year 
all NYSE stocks are allocated to two groups (small, S or 
big, B) based upon whether their market capitalisation is 
less than or greater than median market capitalisation of 
NYSE stocks. Stocks are also sorted into three book-to-
market groups (low, medium, high) based upon the 
breakpoints for the bottom 30% (L), middle 40% (M) and 
top 30% (H) values of book equity-to-market 
capitalisations for NYSE stocks. Six size-BE/ME portfolios 
(SL, SM, SH, BL, BH, BM) are then formed using the 
intersections of the breakpoints defined above. Value-
weighted monthly returns on the six portfolios are 
calculated from July to the following June. The size factor, 
pst, is the difference, each month, between the average 
returns on the three small-stock portfolios (SL, SM, SH) 
and the three big-stock portfolios (BL, BM, BH). The BE/
ME factor, prt, is the difference each month between the 
average returns on the two high BE/ME portfolios (SH and 
BH) and the two low BE/ME portfolios (SL and BL). The 
‘Sum B’ model adjusts for non-synchronous trading by 
including each factor and each factor lagged by one time 
period. The reported sum betas equal the sum of the 
contemporaneous and lagged regression coefficients. 
Estimates are calculated using the previous 60 months of 
returns. More detail on the construction of the firm size 
and BE/ME factors can be found in Fama and French 
(1995). The factors are available on French’s website. The 
risk-free rate of interest used to estimate the cost of equity 
capital was the average ECB 30-day T-bill rate over the 
time period for this study 2005–08, 4.93%. The long-run 
historical market risk premium as of December 2003 was 
8.44% (Ibbotson 2005). Standard deviations are shown in 
brackets. The t-test shows the significance of the difference 
between a purely domestic investor / investor based in the 
US, Eurozone (EUR), UK (GBP) or Switzerland (CHF).
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Table 6.2: fama–french Three-factor cost of capital estimates for Eu firms
Panel A: EU Firms
Type of exposure
Extent of 



















































T-test pval 0.699 0.566 0.387 0.602 0.401
























T-test pval 0.931 0.051 0.088 0.046 0.082
























T-test pval 0.946 0.499 0.336 0.478 0.355
Extent of 
























T-test pval 0.985 0.014 0.026 0.012 0.024
Extent of 





































T-test pval na 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.001
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Panel B: US Firms
Type of exposure
Extent of 



















































T-test pval 0.405 0.379 0.486 0.379 0.379
























T-test pval 0.098 0.486 0.489 0.536 0.486
























T-test pval 0.444 0.536 0.625 0.486 0.536
Extent of 
























T-test pval 0.735 0.489 0.562 0.489 0.489
Extent of 





































T-test pval na 1.000 0.997 0.998 0.997
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The FF3F costs of capital average shown in Table 6.2 is 
approximately 0.5% higher than the comparable CAPM 
costs of capital for both EU and US firms (Table 6.1). The 
higher FF3F estimates reflect the risk-premia for firm size 
and the BE/ME factor. Hence, it is likely to be important for 
firms to utilise a multiple-factor model when estimating 
the cost of capital. 
The FF3F cost of capital estimates for US firms are 
consistent with the FF3F estimates for all industries, which 
average about 3.5% (after adjusting for the risk-free rate, 
which was about 2.5% lower in Ibbotson’s analysis (2005) 
than in ours). The FF3F cost of capital estimates for US 
firms should be somewhat higher than average CAPM 
estimates for EU firms, as they tend to have more 
sensitivity to the BE/ME factor. There are no statistically 
significant relationships, however, between the extent of 
exposure to various types of derivatives use and FF3F cost 
of capital estimates of either US or EU firms (see Table 6.2, 
Panels A and B).
6.3.1 full-information costs of capital
The full-information CAPM beta coefficients for EU sample 
firms are shown in Table 6.3. The beta estimates shown in 
the table are the industry-participation intercept 
coefficients (bmjf  ) from the CAPM FIB regression (equation 
(6) on page 40) on all EU sample firms that met our 
sample selection criteria. The dependent variable in the 
regression is the vector of sum beta estimates obtained 
from equation (3) (see page 39). Table 6.3 displays full-
information CAPM beta estimates for EU firms. The 
full-information beta is estimated from the cross-sectional 
regression shown in equation (11).
Bmi = S Bfmj(wi) + vmj  (11)
where 
Bmi is the equity beta estimated using equation (3) for 
firm i
Bfmj is the estimated full-information beta for industry j
wj is the per cent of firm i’s net sales in industry j
 
The regression is estimated by OLS (equally weighted) and 
via weighted least squares (market weighted). The latter is 
used so we can obtain market-capitalisation weighted 
industry full-information betas. The weight is equal to the 
market capitalisation of firm i relative to the market 
capitalisation of all NYSE stocks. Any firm with an 
estimated beta greater than 5 or less than –5 is removed 
from the sample. The full-information regression was 
estimated separately for each calendar year and as a 
pooled regression across all four years. The risk-free rate 
of interest used to estimate the cost of equity capital was 
the average ECB 30 day T-bill rate over the time period for 
this study 2005–08, 4.93%. The long-run historical market 
-risk premium as of December 2003 was 8.44% (Ibbotson  
2005). Standard deviations are shown in brackets. The 
t-test shows the significance of the difference between a 
purely domestic investor and an investor based in the US, 
Eurozone (EUR), UK (GBP) or Switzerland (CHF). 
We conducted the FIB estimation separately by year and 
also conducted a panel data regression including the data 
from all four years of the sample period in a single 
regression. Only market-value weighted averages, based 
on the distribution of sales between domestic, EU or US 
and non-EU and non-US markets, are shown in the Table 
6.3. Whereas the equally weighted averages provide an 
indication of the beta for the average firm, the market-
value weighted averages provide an indication of the 
systematic risk sensitivity for the industry as a whole. We 
focus most of the discussion on the panel data results, but 
the annual averages are generally quite similar.
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Table 6.3: full information CAPM beta and cost of capital estimates with sum beta for Eu firms adjustment for financial 
services industries
Panel A: EU Firms
Type of exposure
Extent of 



















































T-test pval 0.172 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
























T-test pval 0.175 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
























T-test pval 0.173 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002
Extent of 
























T-test pval 0.172 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002
Extent of interest 





































T-test pval diff 
FF3F v FIB 0.172 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001
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Panel B: US Firms
Type of exposure
Extent of 



















































T-test pval 0.804 0.215 0.238 0.221 0.206
























T-test pval 0.233 0.799 0.926 0.786 0.927
























T-test pval 0.806 0.410 0.518 0.404 0.532
Extent of 
























T-test pval 0.622 0.397 0.430 0.374 0.438
Extent of 
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The value-weighted estimates suggest that the FIB CAPM 
cost of equity capital for US and EU firms is approximately 
0.5–1%. The estimates are based on regressions (6)–(8) 
(see pages 40–41) with the sum beta estimates as 
dependent variables. For EU firms (Table 6.3, Panel A), all 
coefficients are highly statistically significant. Although 
standard errors for other industries are not shown, nearly 
all the industry participation coefficients are also 
statistically significant.
Panel estimates in Table 6.3 show that EU firms have 
higher market systematic risk beta estimates than US 
firms (see Panel B), which do not provide any evidence of 
statistically different cost of capital estimates for low 
versus high derivatives users. This provides further 
evidence that US firms’ stock returns are much more 
sensitive to financial distress than stocks in general and 
that financial distress significantly increases the cost of 
capital for EU firms.
Based on value-weighted estimates, the cost of equity 
capital for EU firms is 4.0%. Because FIB estimates focus 
only on the financial industry components of financial 
guarantee betas, the numbers differ from those in Tables 
6.1–6.3, which present betas for the entire firm rather than 
specific business lines. Nonetheless, the full-information 
costs of capital for EU firms in Tables 6.1–6.2 are 
consistent with the results shown in Table 6.3. 
Based on the equally weighted results shown in Table 6.3, 
the average US firm has a significantly higher cost of 
capital than the average EU firm. Based on the value-
weighted results, the average US firm has a significantly 
higher cost of capital than for all other equivalent non-
financial firms in the EU.
The most important implication of Tables 6.1 and 6.2 is 
that the FF3F costs of capital appear to be substantially 
larger than the CAPM costs of capital. The FIB FF3F cost of 
capital for EU firms is approximately 4%, whereas the 
CAPM cost of capital is about 3.5%. The FF3F model leads 
to higher cost of capital estimates for EU firms than the 
CAPM for two primary reasons: (1) the FF3F systematic 
market risk betas in Table 6.2 are larger than the 
comparable CAPM betas in Table 6.1; and (2) the FF3F 
model imposes positive cost of capital premia for small 
size and financial distress which are not present under the 
CAPM. The risk premium component of the CAPM cost of 
capital for EU firms for the equally weighted case in Table 
6.1 is 2.7%. For the equally weighted case in Table 6.2, the 
risk premium from the CAPM beta factor is 2.6%, the risk 
premium for the size factor is 0.51%, and the risk premium 
for the BE/ME factor is 0.5%, for a total risk premium of 
4%, approximately 0.5% higher than under CAPM. Clearly, 
controlling for factors other than systematic market risk 
makes a significant difference, with the financial distress 
premium playing a pivotal role. 
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7. Conclusion
Overall, we find strong traces of support for the view that 
derivatives use by complex multinationals performs a risk 
management role in mitigating sources of idiosyncratic 
risk and incentive problems. Many of the factors 
associated with derivatives use also imply that the capital 
structure policy of large conglomerates can be best viewed 
from an integrated and dynamic corporate financial 
perspective. In addition, our hypotheses predict and 
uncover interesting new dimensions in the relationship 
between the total amount of derivatives use and firm-risk 
characteristics. Even so, our results are also conditioned 
by broader institutional, regulatory and accounting quality 
issues that affect the location and reporting environment 
of US and EU firms. In particular, our findings support the 
hypothesis that the enforceability of strict hedge 
accounting rules may vary from a strict registration 
rule-based approach (US) to disclosure enforcement (EU). 
Overall, we find a fairly robust relationship between both 
the propensity to use derivatives and the amount of use, 
and various financial characteristics of firms, although 
both the statistical strength and direction of these 
relationships vary considerably across the regions in which 
these firms are based. In particular, our finding that EU 
firms tend to view derivatives use much more liberally than 
that implied by the relatively narrow and specific focus of 
whether they are qualified for hedging treatment raises 
important questions concerning the corporate governance 
and accountability of these organisations to their 
shareholders and other stakeholders.
Extreme caution must be given to these findings, however, 
given the relatively short time-frame between the initial 
adoption of IAS by large European firms, and the 
implementation of costly and complex associated 
derivatives reporting requirements. Our sample period was 
not sufficiently long to undertake robustness tests on the 
effects of changes in fundamental economics affecting the 
provision of and demand for derivatives use, and various 
accounting and regulatory factors that control and mitigate 
the overall predicted relationships. Further research is 
needed to update and validate the overall results reported, 
particularly in the light of more recent changes to 
derivatives reporting after the latest financial crisis.
While we have paid much attention to understanding the 
sources and nature of derivatives use by multinationals, 
and their broader linkages to corporate financial policy, 
our results and analysis can be further extended in a 
number of dimensions. Further research is needed to 
identify better measures for foreign currency and interest 
rate exposure of multinationals, which have complex and 
interacting exposure to both types of instrument. More 
research is also needed to identify sources and the nature 
of idiosyncratic risk and discretionary accruals, both of 
which contribute to the opaqueness of reporting by these 
large entities. Finally, more work is needed to tease out the 
implications and interrelationships between overall 
corporate financial policy, including risk management 
related to derivatives, and other sources of retained 
capital, such as pension funds and other post-retirement 
benefits. 
This study exploits newly available accounting disclosures 
concerning derivatives exposures to examine the 
association between derivatives use, type of derivatives 
use and measurement type and amount of derivatives use, 
and the quality of earnings and cash flows, for a sample of 
US and EU multinational firms from the FTSE Global 500. 
Further evidence on this issue is relevant given the size 
and concentration of resources in large corporations, the 
increasing trend towards globalisation in capital markets 
and service and good provision, and increasing public 
policy concerns about the opacity of reporting by 
multinationals in complex and changing and uncertain 
regulatory environments.
In contrast to previous research, the present research is 
the first to identify incentive problems as a specific 
alternative justification for the use of derivatives by 
multinational firms. It is also the first to show a direct 
comparison of the determinants and nature of derivatives 
use by US and EU-based multinationals. Our analysis 
focuses attention on the use of derivatives by EU firms in 
the three years immediately surrounding the 
harmonisation of IFRS, where standardised currency and 
interest rate environments make comparison with their US 
competitors plausible and interesting. In undertaking our 
research, we also identify new variables associated with 
derivatives use, such as idiosyncratic risk, discretionary 
accruals and pension-related sources of firm-specific 
underfunding and risk. We are the first to identify 
corruption, regulatory quality and accounting as being an 
integral part of these choices, and extend our analysis to 
include the speculative trading of derivatives. Thus, our 
study provides a number of new insights into old issues 
concerning the determinants of derivatives use and their 
broader risk management implications.
We predict, and find, that there is a relatively strong and 
robust association between both the propensity to use 
derivatives and the level of use of derivatives with a range 
of firm-specific idiosyncratic and financial risk factors. We 
also predict that these relationships hold for interest rate 
and foreign currency derivatives and that these 
relationships help explain changes in the use level of 
derivatives. These results are robust across both US and 
European firms. The findings both clarify and condition the 
results on the overall use of derivatives. 
We estimate the cost of capital for EU firms under various 
assumptions about the methodology of estimation as well 
as different currency denominators of the investor in these 
firms. Our cost of capital estimates are robust to 
alternative methodologies. Using the full-information beta 
(FIB) approach overcomes the limitations of the CAPM and 
FF3F methodologies in not recognising the differential 
costs associated with sales when segmented into 
domestic, EU/US and other markets. We find that the cost 
of capital for heavy derivatives users of various types is in 
many cases significantly higher than for low derivatives 
users. These results are robust to different methodologies 
and currency denominations.
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55DERIVATIVES REPORTING PRACTICES BY MULTINATIONALS APPENDIX: DERIVATIVES DISCLOSURES FROM SAMPLE 
fROM ThE 2006 ANNuAL REPORT Of 
GLAXOSMiThKLiNE
financial risk management
A number of derivative financial instruments are used to 
manage the market risks from Treasury operations. 
Derivative instruments, principally comprising forward 
foreign currency contracts and interest rate and currency 
swaps, are used to swap borrowings and liquid assets into 
the currencies required for Group purposes and to 
manage exposure to funding risks from changes in foreign 
currency rates and interest rates (p. 127).
39 Financial instruments and related disclosures continued (p. 134)
The following table sets out the principal amount and fair values of derivatives 


























contracts – – 2,151 74
Interest rate 
swaps 1,696 (40) 1,848 (42)
Cross currency 
swaps 500 (5) 500 3
Derivative instruments
SFAS 133, ‘Accounting for Derivative Instruments and 
Hedging Activities’, as amended by SFAS 137 and SFAS 
138 and as interpreted by the Derivatives Implementation 
Group, was adopted by the Group with effect from 1st 
January 2001.…[sentences omitted] SFAS 133 prescribes 
requirements for designation and documentation of 
hedging relationships and ongoing assessments of 
effectiveness in order to qualify for hedge accounting 
(p. 140).
Appendix: Derivatives disclosures from sample 
56
fROM ThE 2005 ANNuAL REPORT Of ANhEuSER-
BuSCh COMPANiES
financial derivatives
Anheuser-Busch uses financial derivatives to mitigate the 
company’s exposure to volatility in commodity prices, 
interest rates, and foreign currency exchange rates. The 
company hedges only exposures in the ordinary course of 
business and company policy prohibits holding or trading 
derivatives for profit.
The company accounts for its derivatives in accordance 
with FAS No. 133, ‘Accounting for Derivative Instruments 
and Hedging Activity,’ which requires all derivatives to be 
carried on the balance sheet at fair value and meet certain 
documentary and analytical requirements to qualify for 
hedge accounting treatment (p. 46).
Derivatives and other financial instruments 
Following are the notional transaction amounts and fair 
values for the company’s outstanding derivatives, 
summarized by risk category and instrument type, at 
December 31 (in millions, with brackets indicating a 









Forwards $115.2 $(2.1) $114.7 $ 0.7
Options 277.2 7.6 151.0 3.8
Total foreign  
currency 392.4 5.5 265.7 4.5
Interest rate:
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